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Shit Harper Did:  





How did a small group of motivated citizens, with limited funds, break into a sphere of political 
commentary reserved for media and political elite? Built by a group of Vancouver-based 
comedians, in 2011, the website Shit Harper Did (SHD) mockingly reframed Harper’s policies 
through a number of satirical YouTube videos begging Canadians not to re-elect the Prime 
Minister. In 2013, SHD relaunched a community-based website, built on NationBuilder, and 
aired a TV commercial crowdfunded on IndieGoGo. They learned new organizing strategies and 
SHD embraced their online community. Their humorous interventions and media tactics have 
complimented their current, long-term strategy enabling them to become a sustained and 
engaged political organization. This group exemplifies how non-elite actors mobilize social 
media and online organizing software to influence Canadian politics. Political advocacy in 
Canada changes as online organizations find new strategies to run issue-based campaigns on the 
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Introduction 
Among Stephen Harper’s most active opponents during his 2011 re-election campaign 
was a small group of Vancouver-based comedians behind Shit Harper Did (SHD). The group 
created a catchy, sharable website and compilation of funny YouTube videos encouraging young 
Canadians to vote for any party other than the Conservatives. Within its first 24 hours, the site 
was so overloaded with hits it crashed. Even though SHD did not bring down the federal 
Conservatives during the 2011 election, over the next two years SHD translated their ‘viral’ 
success into an organization that successfully ran their first issue-based, headline-inspired, 
crowd-funded campaign in 2013. This campaign raised $76,412 to the buy airtime to place an 
advertisement criticising Canada’s Economic Action Plan (CEAP) on Hockey Night in Canada 
during a playoff game. SHD claims, “during the 2011 election, we started out as a few artists. 
With your help we became an unprecedented national community of people speaking truth to 
power” (‘Why You Matter’). In this thesis I explain how “a few artists” in 2011 become a 
“national community” by 2013. SHD represents the changing environment for online, political 
advocacy work in Canada.  
During both campaigns, SHD garnered media attention, entering the ‘political information 
cycle’ (Chadwick, 2013) because of online sharing and new ways of organizing. Technology 
lowers barriers for groups, like SHD, to organize political advocacy campaigns (Karpf, 2012). As 
SHD moves forward, they make room for community members to engage more fully and have 
brought their campaigns offline. SHD found new ways to influence Canadian political discourse, 
bringing up the following questions that drive my research:  
1. What prompted SHD’s tactics and strategies? How do political activists use social media 
and the internet to organize and inform?  
2. How do the previous tactics of a small group of comedians compliment or compete with 
SHD’s current long-term strategies for political organizing and advocacy? How do these 
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new strategies, such as the use of social media, been influenced by, or influence, the 
changing Canadian political and media environment? 
3. Has SHD’s work in exposing the political practices of Stephen Harper influenced media 
coverage of the Conservative government or resulted in political change? Has sharing 
information become a catalyst for political action?  
I use the two campaigns to answer these questions, the first follows SHD’s beginnings. 
SHD was started by with a group of friends and acquaintances, frustrated by the way federal 
Conservative marketed to and represented them. Inspired by online activism occurring in the 
United States and Canada, during the 2011 federal election, SHD aimed to reframe Harper’s tight 
media control and political policies. They joined together to speak out against the re-election of a 
Conservative government. The core group, Cameron Reed, Cam Dales, Kevin Lee, and Nathan 
Dales, and Sean Devlin (Payne, 2011) gathered approximately fifteen people, and pooled $250 
dollars to shoot ten YouTube videos and build a Tumblr website depicting five years of Harper’s 
policies they saw as despicable. Early in the morning on April 11, 2011, they launched a 
Facebook group, Tumblr website, and four of the YouTube videos. By the time they woke up the 
next day, the site had reached 2 million hits and had crashed their server, throwing them into a 
flurry of election excitement and a bit of controversy. The YouTube videos garnered between 
12,000-200,000 hits. The day after their most popular video was posted it was listed as 
YouTube’s fifth most-viewed video in Canada (Hiltz, 2011). SHD’s success even raised 
questions about third-party spending laws from Election Canada. On Election Day, May 2, 2011, 
a majority Conservative government, with Stephen Harper at its helm, was elected and though the 
group felt defeated, they had built a community that would be integral to their future success 
(Dales, 2014).  
After the 2011 election SHD organizers began to think of their first campaign not as a 
failure, but as an opportunity that could be turned into something new. They had a huge mailing 
list and members of their Facebook community kept requesting more campaigns. Sean Devlin 
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learned about the UpWorthy model of A/B testing and realized the potential they had to run 
campaigns with support from the community built during the election. In April 2013, they 
launched a new website, SHD 2.0, built on the organizing platform NationBuilder with help from 
the company cStreet Campaigns. This site allowed SHD to run issue-based campaigns and 
strategically target their network. Their first campaign targeted CEAP – a plan aimed at getting 
Canada through the 2008 recession by creating jobs and lowering taxes (Flaherty, 2012). The 
media criticized the plan on multiple fronts. Their main critique was that it had spent more than 
$100-million on advertising since 2009 (Curry, 2014). SHD’s first form of dissent was a series of 
YouTube videos mocking the government’s advertisements. Positive responses poured in from 
community members requesting SHD put the videos on television. SHD knew if they that to be a 
community they needed to embrace supporters’ offers to participate. So, they launched an 
IndieGoGo fundraising campaign, made a new commercial, and enlisted community members to 
donate, make content, and help share the campaign. They raised enough money to air the 
advertisement during an NHL playoff game on Hockey Night in Canada using strategies they had 
borrowed from UpWorthy and NationBuilder’s toolset.  
I begin with my literature review (Chapter One) where I demonstrate that SHD is a prime 
example of how social media and online organizing software changes political advocacy 
strategies in Canada. The chapter is divided into three sections that explain: why SHD ran their 
campaigns, looking at the media environment in Canada; the way in which SHD became popular, 
examining media tactics and political satire; and how SHD was able to run their campaigns, 
pointing out online organizational affordances. Drawing on theories of media power, media 
tactics and online political organizing I show that both SHD campaigns have many nuances. The 
first campaign used social media tactics to inform while the second moved to a form of issue-
based campaign strategies to organize.  
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In Chapter Two, I outline my research methodology, consisting of a triangulated process 
to unpack each campaign: interviews, content analysis of SHD’s mainstream media coverage, 
and web sphere analysis. I first justify the dates used to limit each campaign to a specific time 
period and then move into a broader discussions of how each method is used. The web sphere 
analysis follows traffic tags associated with each SHD campaign across various online platforms 
and are used to build a timeline of sharing (Appendix One and Four). The media analysis 
demonstrates how the media frames SHD during each campaign and how SHD influenced 
broader political conversations happening at that time. The interviews with SHD organizer, Cam 
Dales, and cStreet Campaigns employee, Josh Stuart, provide background information and 
motivations behind each campaign. These methods show the intricate structures behind SHD, 
how they were more broadly represented, and how both campaigns worked differently. 
SHD’s 2011 federal election campaign is the focus of Chapter Three. I first outline the 
context of Canada’s so-called “first” social media election. Next, I explain the inspiration behind 
SHD’s satirical campaign, describing the website and YouTube Videos. I discuss how the 
campaign was shared across online networks and offer a content analysis of SHD’s mainstream 
media coverage. This chapter shows that SHD broke into a ‘political information cycle’ 
(Chadwick, 2013) because people cared deeply about the issues featured in the campaign and 
shared them online (Benkler 2006). SHD’s campaign shows that in 2011, online technology had 
lowered barriers to running a successful information campaign (Karpf 2011). SHD mobilized 
social media to run a tactical campaign that filled the news feeds of people across Canada.  
The focus of Chapter Four is SHD’s second campaign, the anti-CEAP televisions 
advertisement that relies on a form of issue-based campaigning. A new organizational software 
and website platform, NationBuilder strategically enabled SHD to air the television 
advertisement. After unpacking SHD’s new model of campaigning and the NationBuilder 
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platform, I outline the various elements of the anti-CEAP campaign and the context in which it 
happened. A timeline of online sharing reveals the different ways this campaign reached 
community members. SHD did not rely exclusively on social media users to share their work 
instead they directly targeted their community for financial support and content creation. SHD 
broke into the ‘political information cycle’ again and, as the media analysis reveals, they brought 
two new critiques into discourse surrounding CEAP: the rising use of food banks and the rising 
average household debt across the country. SHD entered a new stage of organizing (Karpf, 2012 
and Bimber et al., 2006 and 2012), becoming responsive to their community, running specific, 
issue-based campaigns, and moving some of their advocacy work offline.  
These two campaigns represent the changing political advocacy landscape in Canada. 
Though much of the research done in this area speaks to the American context, the SHD case 
proves that in Canada, too, new ways of organizing are changing how groups can coordinate 
campaigns that can influence the ever-changing media landscape. As SHD moves forward, their 
website tagline urges visitors to “Know. It all.” This commitment to information sharing has been 
an intrinsic part of each campaign. Since 2011, SHD became a trusted organization that works to 
inform Canadians about the Harper Conservatives, pushing for more media coverage and scrutiny 
about their policies. SHD is an significant case study because the group has found new ways to 
embrace and mobilize their large network of supporters 
	  	   	  6	  
Chapter One: Literature Review 
As a phenomenon, the Shit Harper Did (SHD) campaigns resonate with numerous 
scholarly conversations regarding media, technology and politics. The group is representative of 
a shifting political advocacy environment. As it can be seen with SHD’s work, as well as in other 
organization such as LeadNow and OpenMedia, an American style of issue-based campaign 
strategies has crossed the border. To best understand how SHD ran two different styles of 
campaigns, I explore three areas: the media environment in Canada (or why SHD did what they 
did); the tradition of tactical media and political satire (or the way in which SHD became 
popular); and the nuances of how SHD organized their work because of new and social media (or 
their ability to act). I will draw a through line between the media environment in Canada, tactical 
media and political organizing.  
Part I: Media and Democracy 
In order to argue that SHD impacted the Canadian political environment and influenced 
media coverage, I will show how SHD works within and responds to the Canadian media 
context. Politics, be that debates, policies, conversations, are not merely represented in the media, 
they also occur in the media and online. Keeping this in mind, I first outline how the media 
determines what is newsworthy. Then I explain how the media is moving from a 24-hour news 
cycle to a more hybridized ‘political information cycle.’ Next, I show how Harper’s relationship 
with the Canadian press changed at the same time as there the media shifts into a ‘political 
information cycle.’ Finally, I apply this new media reality to the Canadian context showing how 
the internet influenced media and political environment. 
The media plays a key role in any democracy and politics is ‘informational.’ Castells 
(1997) argues that, “outside the media sphere there is only political marginality. What happens in 
this media-dominated political space is not determined by the media: it is an open social and 
	  	   	  7	  
political process” (p. 312). Rogers (2004) carries this forward, arguing that “politics are 
performed not through classic government-citizen exchanges and deliberations but rather through 
the mediation of the press and broadcasting media” (p. 5). Politics occurs on the web, in a similar 
manner to which it occurs in the media – neither are merely a representation. The mainstream 
media’s key role is informing Canadians about the happenings of the government and public 
affairs. In this regard, they are central to maintaining healthy democracy and inform citizens 
through mediated representations of politics.  
The media sets a political agenda by choosing what story to share. Theories of agenda 
setting, such as those of McComb and Shaw (1972) suggest that, “in choosing and displaying 
news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political 
reality” (in Barber, 2008, p. 623). Cohen (1963) echoes the sentiment arguing, “the press may not 
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about” (p. 120 in Barber, 2008, p. 623). The press makes one 
issue more salient than another by giving more space or coverage to certain events (Soroka, 2002, 
p. 265-66). Not only does the media make one issue seem more important than another, shaping 
political reality, they are central to the ways in which the public is able to participate in the 
democratic process (Kozolanka, 2014, p. 15). They serve as a check on political power while at 
the same time determining what is politically relevant.  
The ‘political information cycle’ 
As mainstream media continues to determine what is newsworthy, news outlets are also 
shifting out of a the 24-hour news cycle, that according to Rose (2012) limits reporting to “what 
is episodic and ephemeral rather than thematic and enduring” (p. 151). This 24-hour news cycle 
is predated by a daily news based cycle. Today this shift in news sharing is from a ‘news cycle’ 
to a ‘political information cycle.’ The ‘political information cycle’ is a “complex assemblage in 
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which the logics - technologies, genres, norms, behaviours, and organizational forms – of the 
‘new’ online media are hybridized with those supposedly ‘old’ broadcast and newspaper media” 
(Chadwick, 2013, p. 63). This cycle has dissolved the distinctiveness between political actors, the 
public, and the media and created a hybrid media landscape (Chadwick, 2013, p. 4). As online 
news sites gain credibility, social media, too, can play a larger role in influencing the news. At 
the same time that users share news on social media platforms, they are also beginning to shape 
the news coverage itself, sharing information before it is even been picked up by the press 
(Chadwick, 2012, p. 44). Not only are there new portals to access this news, but also there are 
new ways that people can interact, express and engage with this content (Chadwick, 2012, p. 59). 
This new kind of cycle is a hybridization of the ‘old’ broadcast media with the ‘new’ online 
media (Chadwick, 2012, p. 63). 
The media landscape in Canada 
 
This shift to a ‘political information cycle’ occurred Canada at the same time as the 
relationship changed between the government and the Canadian press during the Harper 
administration. Ultimately, I argue that the relationship Harper formed with the press is 
detrimental to democracy – which gives all the more reason for groups like SHD to respond in 
creative ways to raise awareness about such events. Harper’s relationship with the media is 
different than past administrations and tenuous at best.  
Harper’s relationship was shaped during his time in the Canadian Alliance Party, a 
political party that suffered from poor image management and felt the press had a “mildly social 
activist tilt” (Sears, 2006, p. 6). The party began to learn appropriate media approaches or ‘tricks 
of the trade’ from the American right to offset this (Sears, 2006, p. 6 and Marland, 2012, p. 220). 
Over the course of Harper’s career this interpretation of the media landscape as left-leaning 
worked its way into his ongoing campaign efforts. He finds ways to vilify the ‘liberal press’ in 
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order to gain support from the Conservative base. Harper brands himself as a ‘common man’ as 
“an attempt to defy negative image stereotypes… juxtaposing [his] patriotic love of hockey 
against perceptions that he is an aloof ideologue” (Marland, 2012, p. 222). Susan Delacourt, a 
political reporter from The Toronto Star, suggests in an interview with Brown, that his strained 
relationship with the press is highly intentional and politically motivated. She argues that Harper, 
a former media pundit, knows the ins and outs of the field and frames the media as elite for his 
own advantage (Brown, 2014). This works both in his favour, pandering to his supporters, and to 
his detriment, causing much public and media outcry. The media, in turn, has perpetuated and 
promoted the status quo of Canadian politics (Barber, 2008, p. 622). The political leanings of 
national papers were not found to be skewed one way or another (Editors, 2006, p.2).1 Soroka 
argues that media in Canada are relatively neutral, asserting that if anything in 2006, “Stephen 
Harper certainly enjoyed more favourable news and opinion coverage” than his opponents 
(Editors, 2006, p.2).  
Upon his election in 2006, Harper carried over his media management style to the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO) and the press gallery in Ottawa. The orchestrated media relationship 
became news itself when reports began to surface about Harper’s refusal to appear in front of the 
press gallery and the media’s reactionary response to not attend any of his highly coordinated 
media events (Global National, 2006 and Wilson, 2006). Harper did away with traditional media 
scrums following cabinet meetings and granting reporters access to cabinet ministers (Global 
National, 2006). He banned journalists and photographers from events, and the PMO provided a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Barber’s (2008) research about the 2006 federal election coverage found neither a bias for the left nor the right but 
rather media bias was given to the poll’s electoral front-runner (p. 622). An exception was the Calgary Herald 
supported Harper. Other political leanings were contained in op-ed pieces (Editors, 2006, p. 2).  
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list of who could ask questions when (Global National, 2006).2 Over the course of the next eight 
years, Harper’s image also became more and more tailored.  
By 2009, Harper’s picture service sent out two images a day to local and national news 
services, claiming that the service provided small press access to all events rather than just having 
photographers present (Chase, 2009). Marland (2012) criticizes this image control and argues that 
the release of a photo-a-day “reduce[s] the perceived need for journalists to attend photo ops 
because political marketers can communicate an unmediated message directly to target 
audiences” (p. 217).3 Sending out daily photos of the Prime Minister created a two tier media 
system based on those outlets that choose to run with the government’s story of the day and those 
that do not (Marland, 2012, p. 228). The Conservative government makes the choice to share 
political information in new ways directly sending messages to small and ethnic media (Marland, 
2012, p. 221) and live tweeting the Prime Minister’s pre-throne speech rather than allowing press 
access claiming that there were new ways for citizens to get their information (a. Canadian Press, 
2013 and Harper, 2013).4 
The Canadian press did not take lightly to this treatment. In 2008, the Canadian 
Newspaper Association filed a complaint to the Information Commissioner that bureaucrats were 
“deliberately delaying access-to-information requests” (Collob in Campion-Smith, 2008). In 
response, the Information Commissioner of Canada, Suzanne Legault said, in her 2010-11 report, 
that in the past ten years that in “the exercise of discretion in determining which information to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Even public access to the hallways that ministers and staff of the Prime Minister were frequently cut off. Susan 
Delacourt, finds this measure unreasonable, on one occasion she was barred from a hallway “I threw a fit reminding 
[the guard] it was my House of Commons… and it wasn’t the Prime Minister’s place to close the corridors” (Brown, 
2014). Even when the hallway was opened that day, Delacourt believes that “this PMO tries harder...[to] block 
corridors of power physically bar [the media]” (Brown, 2014).  
3 This tight image control included the hiring of an image consultant, manager of visual communications and 
manager of new media and marketing, allowing only government videographers and photographers access to his 
military visits (Marland, 2012 p. 220). 
4 Harper’s questionable press relationship continued into 2013 (Harper, 2013; Naumetz, 2011; Chase, 2012; 
O’Malley, 2013; a. Canadian Press, 2013; b. Canadian Press, 2013).  
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disclose has been skewed toward greater protection of information” (Waddell, 2012, p. 272). In 
other words, the media environment on Parliament Hill has greatly shifted. Delacourt sums it up, 
“the implications were important and I think we [the Canadian press] lost that battle” (Brown, 
2014). Whether or not this battle between Harper and the press has been won or lost, it is highly 
demonstrative of the changing ways in which Canadians can access news about their government.  
Applying the ‘political information cycle’ in Canada 
Tight media control comes at the expense of democracy. This control allows the 
Conservative government to stay ‘on message’ and reduce the chance a party member would 
contradict the PMO (Marland, 2012, p. 223). It also demonstrates the media’s important role in 
terms of informing citizens. The relationship between the Harper government and the press 
contextualizes the environment in which SHD began and continues their political advocacy and 
points to the kind of power that the media has in informing citizens and holding politicians 
accountable. In a ‘political information cycle’ social media is a platform for the traditional media, 
political elite, and political advocates to participate in the same space (Chadwick, 2013). In 
Canada, political advocates and the government are moving, more and more, online. Even though 
technology changes the ways people make and access media, it is important to note that 
mainstream media, such as the large daily papers and news networks, still play a hand in setting 
the agenda for smaller media sources (Fletcher, 2014, p. 31). Fletcher (2014) suggests that, 
“politicians, advocacy groups, and even online bloggers measure their success largely on the 
basis of how successful they are in attracting news media attention and influencing the nature of 
coverage” (p. 31). Though mainstream media may still have control over what becomes 
newsworthy, as Canada media shifts to a ‘political information cycle’ politics and political 
advocacy also begins to transform.  
 
	  	   	  12	  
Certainly, the way in which Canadians get their news and media is changing. Harper’s 
choice to live-Tweet the pre-throne speech rather than allowing members of the press to be 
present is just one demonstration, of how the Conservative government seems to believe 
Canadians do and should get their political information. This allows them to blatantly bypass 
traditional media control. Given this, it is significant that the platforms on which Canadians 
access this media are the same platforms that SHD responds to Stephen Harper’s actions. This 
kind of work is only emerging on broader Canadian politics, where political parties and the media 
have begun to be more “responsive to currents emerging in the changed media environment” with 
blogs planting the seeds for future stories in the news (Barney, 2011, p. 206-207). Canadians 
have convenient access to better and more diverse political information, than ever before, as well 
as more opportunities for interactive participatory communication because of the rise in internet 
use (Barney, 2011, p. 198). Barney (2011) poses the question “[are] emerging media technologies 
contributing to a more participatory, inclusive and responsive democracy in Canada?” (p. 199). 
Though his answer is that it remains unclear, there is, without a doubt, more access and use of 
new technologies, yet not always necessarily for political ends (Barney, 2011, p. 205).  
The information cycle is especially apparent during the 2011 federal election. Waddell 
(2012) argues that 2011 election represented the end of the old media system in Canada. He 
argues that the “digital world is transforming how Canadians communicate about politics” while 
the “electoral apparatus” still lags behind (Waddell, 2012, p. 369). The internet is more than just 
a venue to communicate about politics, it is another place to gather political information which 
can inspire engagement and be “an avenue for participation itself through social networking or 
volunteer organization sites” (O’Neill, 2009, p. 106). Reilly calls the 2011 federal election, the 
first ‘social media election’ dominated by vote mobs, political satire as a form of Anti-Harper 
critique, fake Twitter accounts and of course the works of SHD (Reilly, 2011). Reilly (2011) asks 
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whether or not new media and satirical engagement have any sort of effect on democracy, or if 
citizens are just “Amusing Ourselves to Death,” (p. 510). He points out that social media 
campaigns “put democratic politics on the table in highly engaging and entertaining ways,” it 
also mobilized a youth vote, provided playful critiques and most importantly provided:  
reason[s] to believe that the unprecedented shifts that shook the foundations of federal 
politics this election may be attributed in part to the growing use(s) of social media and to 
the growing dissemination of satirical and critical comment online. (Reilly, 2011, p. 510)  
Though O’Neil (2009) remains adamant that “newer forms of media... directly affect political 
engagement by providing calls and instruments for action on certain issues” (p. 106-107). Even 
though online social media actions still render success from traditional news coverage, Canadians 
also receive political advocacy and information on social media platforms.  
Bennett & Segerberg (2012) suggest there are two modes of political communication, 
both of which I address in this thesis; “communication has many faces, and scholars of 
contentious action have focused on its role in information seeking and identity, persuasion, 
opinion and the public sphere.” They continue:  
communication is much more than a means of exchanging information and forming 
impressions, or an instrument for sending updates and instructions to followers. 
Communication routines can, under certain conditions, create patterned relationships 
among people that led organization and structure to many aspects social life. (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012, p. 8) 
Communication, they suggest, is not only about information but also organization. In the 
following sections, I discuss first the information aspects of political communication through the 
literature on tactical media and the second section I discuss who new communication 
technologies facilitate as Karpf (2012) puts it “organizing with different organizations (p. 3).” 
Part II: Tactical Media 
As publics form to respond to, critique and provide, synthesized information to others, 
they must develop tactics to engage with a changing media environment. These tactics are a way 
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in which new actors influence the kinds of information citizens receive. In a new media 
environment, attention hijacking and humour create opportunities to bring political advocacy 
issues to the fore-front. SHD’s use of media tactics and their media coverage over the past three 
years is an example of the changing media world. Their attempts to enter the ‘political 
information cycle’ by using a variety of tactics such as culture jamming, attention hijacking and 
political satire.  
Tactical media: a definition 
Tactical media is a ‘do it yourself’ kind of media, Garcia & Lovink (2001) argue that new 
technologies, especially affordable electronics and new forms of distribution, are harnessed by 
publics who either sit against the wider public or are angered by the status quo (p. 90). They 
argue that media tactics aim “to cross borders, connecting and re-wiring a variety of disciplines 
and always taking full advantage of the free spaces in the media that are continually appearing 
because of the pace of technological change and regulatory uncertainty” (Garcia & Lovink, 2001, 
p. 91). These kinds of media do not necessitate a grand revolution, instead Raley (2009) suggests 
they are about engaging in a sort of “micropolitics of disruption, intervention, and education” and 
through this they allow critical thinking to happen (p. 1). Renzi (2010) suggests that tactical 
media should be viewed as a socially constructed space that contains social interactions 
including, “communicative practices, organization dynamics and creative processes” that are 
voluntary and temporary (p. 76). By viewing tactical media this way, I can highlight the ways 
SHD is able to work online using a variety of tactics, rather than focusing on the individuals 
behind the movement. It gives space to dissect the organizational practices afforded by new 
technologies and the kinds of media they are producing.  
By translating literature about tactical media’s use of cheap, accessible electronics to 
today’s use of ‘free’ or inexpensive social media, tactical media can then encompass how publics 
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have used social media to build towards social action. Gerbaudo (2012) argues that social media 
is “chiefly responsible for the construction of a choreography of assembly as a process of 
symbolic construction of public space which facilitates and guides the physical assembling of a 
highly dispersed and individualized constituency” (p. 5). One of social media’s roles is to bring 
together and organize citizens that are physically far apart or otherwise limited. Social media is a 
tool that allows for organization and tactical interventions. Those orchestrating such online 
events are ‘soft leaders’ setting the scene and building a space for collective action to occur 
(Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 5). The ease of organizing and information sharing echoes back to this 
hybridized ‘political information cycle’ that Chadwick envisions where non-elite actors are able 
to act more publicly. According to Boler (2010), dominant, mainstream media spaces and social 
media tactics are not separate from each other but rather tactical media works 
“within/against/upon” the dominant media (p. 29). She also argues that the internet is creating a 
space for new ways to share “constructions of truth” (Boler, 2010, p. 6). People are empowered 
to provide a different understanding of events than mainstream media. There then is a “‘truth’ as 
propagated as fact by corporate media and a ‘truth’ as ideas that emerge from the sociability of 
new pathways of sharing knowledge” (Lipton in Boler, 2010, p. 6). There remains to be much 
debate over this new kind of political action being little more than ‘slacktivism’ however I will 
discuss this in greater detail in Part III.  
Culture jamming and protest 
The creativity behind the early media tactics of SHD can be viewed in a trajectory of 
other sorts of tactical media movements. In particular, the practice of culture jamming is one 
specific way in which SHS captures public attention. This is a kind of tactical media, a 
“rhetorical protest” that disrupts the regular media structures of everyday life (Harold, 2004, p. 
192). Culture jamming is “an artful proliferation of messages, a rhetorical process of intervention 
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and invention, which challenges the ability of corporate discourse to make meaning in predictable 
ways” (Harold, 2004, p. 192). Adbusters, is a classic example of this tactic. They use this 
technique to undermine multinational corporations through a series of different tactics such as 
parodies and media hoaxing (Harold, 2004, p. 190). What happens when such parodies are made, 
like the SHD’s 2011 election campaign is that they attempt to “talk back to the multimedia 
spectacle” (Harold, 2004, p. 192). Beautiful Trouble defines culture jamming as “altering the 
meaning of a target’s messaging or brand; packaging critical messages as highly contagious 
media viruses” (Malitz, 2012, p. 28). This definition brings up some interesting concepts, 
especially when thinking of SHD’s critique of Harper’s highly tailored media image. As I have 
outlined, Harper’s image was clearly orchestrated as a political strategy and for message control. 
The 2011 SHD website took that image (the softer side of Harper with a kitten) and the 2013 
anti-CEAP campaign and altered the meaning. Not only did they repurpose and alter these 
images, they repackaged the politics of the Conservative government in a humorous ways. In 
2011, SHD created a “highly contagious media virus” (Malitz, 2012, p. 30), robbing the image of 
Harper of its power. In 2013, they did the same to CEAP and its message of being a successful 
program. The literature of culture-jamming is often used in regard to corporate rebranding and 
manipulation however it serves here as an interesting way to rethink the ways in which political 
advocacy groups can challenge their opponents. Perhaps though, Jenkin’s (2006) critique of 
Culture Jamming is important to note, he argues that this kind of work might be considered 
‘culture poaching’ not culture jamming highlighting those who “want to appropriate their 
content, imagining a more democratic, responsive, and diverse style of popular culture. Jammers 
want to destroy media power, while poachers want a share of it” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 150). It is 
difficult to define SHD’s work as one or the other as they, themselves, have not articulated 
whether they aim to get a piece of power or if they aim to destroy media power.  
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Being funny 
SHD disrupts the government’s policies and reframes issues but it cannot go without 
saying that perhaps the biggest draw for their work is the fact that it is funny. They couple 
novelty with humour that “forces us to reconsider the very meaning of political action” (Hynes et 
al., 2007 p. 107). Satire “is a tactic of resistance for those who sit outside the circles of power, 
and its success depends on the complicity of an audience of cultural insiders who are privy to the 
codes needed to ‘get the joke’” (Tinic, 2009, p. 168). According to Boler & Turpin (2010), a 
joking tone allows one to say what is usually left unsaid to a population that may not usually 
encounter those politics for a variety of reasons (p. 384). For example, Jones (2010) argues that 
Tina Fey’s Palin impression on Saturday Night Live, 
transported the viewer out of the serious context associated with journalism - one that 
offered the view little recourse beyond befuddlement or disbelief - and recontextualized the 
encounter through a comedic lens, thereby granting the view a different perspective from 
which to view the event. (p. 4) 
Removing the serious context from a political issue, this kind of humour, especially in the 2011 
federal election campaign SHD’s YouTube videos, allows people to rethink the stories they 
receive in the mainstream media. SHD challenged the mainstream electoral coverage and CEAP 
with satirical re-interpretations. Satire is a tool, a tactic, “with which to scrutinize its comedic 
subjects allow the situation to be stripped bare and offer the essence of the situation instead” 
(Jones, 2010, p.4). Online there is a growing culture of memes, video mash-ups, and citizen 
participation in media making and “citizens themselves are now empowered to participate in the 
production of political video content - repurposing ... political content for their own political 
critiques” (Jones, 2010, p. 13). Though SHD’s online campaign is neither a meme nor a mash-up, 
social media and online organizing software allows them to actively participate in electoral and 
political conversations by making their own humorous media. Boler (2010) finds political satire 
hopeful as it “speak[s] truth to power,” (a tagline SHD embraces too) however, she argues that 
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some may lament that satire has become one of the best ways to communicate media and political 
critique (p. 34).  
Part III Traffic Tag Timeline: A New Way to Organize 
 New media not only allow new players to influence the ‘political information cycle,’ it 
also affords new ways of organizing. The SHD case study is representative of a community 
dedicated to illuminating and information sharing about the politics of Stephen Harper. 
Slacktivism 
Before getting to the intricacies of such organizations and the opportunities afforded by 
online organizational tools, one must attend to the criticisms of online movements. The problem 
with issue publics, especially those communities that are formed online, is that they can be seen 
as ‘flash in the pan’. There is much debate on the ability for ephemeral online media tactics 
aiming to inform publics to lead to lasting, meaningful change. Arguably, SHD is not ephemeral; 
as the group has used their online ‘virality’ in 2011 to form a meaningful, permanent organization 
in 2013. Benkler (2006) argues that the public can engage with issues pertinent to them in a new 
space created by networked communication (p. 6). These discussions that occur online and the 
act of information sharing, in turn, have the ability to become offline action. The discussions that 
occur in this new, online sphere become public action (Benkler, 2006). Benkler (2006) argues 
that because creating online media content is not about making capital, unlike the motivations 
behind mass media, people participating in online networks have an intrinsic motivation to write 
or comment about what they care about.  
Hindman, however, does not take such a utopian view in his work The Myth of Digital 
Democracy (2009). He argues that digital democracy is impossible because the same power 
structures and elite-dominated media patterns can be seen mirrored in online content (Hindman, 
2009). It is not just anyone on Facebook who can run a successful campaign to oust a political 
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figure – they must be otherwise well connected or well positioned in the power-structure. 
Hindman’s criticism is not taken lightly. It is true that the people behind SHD, from its early days 
and today, were and are well connected in the Canadian progressive movement. Sean Devlin runs 
his own progressive campaign business and Brigette DePape was at one time a household name.5 
Gladwell (2010) too is sceptical of such online collective/connective action and political 
advocacy groups as they are built on “weak ties” that rarely lead to “high risk activism” (p. 3). 
Morozov (2011), another critic, sees loosely structured organizations as doing little more than 
offering insubstantial, low-quality commentary that is drowning out substantive political 
discourse (Morozov, 2011).  
SHD, does not seem to be deterred by the risk of weak ties. They seem to believe that 
online participation is as equally meaningful as traditional methods of political organization. As I 
will show in the subsequent chapters, SHD consistently acknowledges their community; thanking 
them on social media, encouraging supporters to share their message, and, during the 2013 
campaign, making space for supporters to participate in more meaningful ways. Going back to 
the value of publics having the ability to both speak back to the government and translate 
information to citizens reminds us that SHD’s campaigns are never-the-less powerful and 
important work. I position this thesis against these critiques of social media. Whether or not SHD 
removes Harper from power, they have reframed his politics and brought a community together 
in a new and interesting way. SHD brought energy to young Canadians who had been otherwise 
ignored by both the government and political advocacy groups. The people that identified with 
the work of SHD probably already had this political stance, however, it was SHD’s tactics and 
strategies that brought them together. SHD created a community that without the internet would 
not exist today. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 DePape was the parliamentary page that held up a “STOP HARPER” sign during a parliamentary session. 
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Online political organization 
Working against the idea of online weak ties, SHD exemplifies what Bennett & Segerberg 
(2012) call ‘connective action’, which more closely recognizes the role of digital media as an 
organizing agent. They argue that formal organization is no longer required for political advocacy 
and that “taking public action or contributing to a common good becomes an act of personal 
expression and recognition or self validation achieved by sharing ideas and actions in trusted 
relationships” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012 p. 752-53). The motivation for one to join an 
organization such as SHD is not just a result of the kind of work one may do but rather is because 
of the personal relationship s/he can have to work and her/his ability to participate in the group in 
a connected way. Papacharissi (2011) suggests this kind of online activism allows for a more 
fluid kind of activism and civic engagement that gives citizens the ability to choose when, where, 
and how much they participate. This activism “is carving the civic vernacular of younger cohorts 
who integrate digital cultures seamlessly into their everyday routine” of online engagement 
(Papacharissi, 2011, p. 160).  
Connective action occurs simultaneously with more formal, digital forms of organizing. 
Technology creates a new form of connection within organizations, and new forms of political 
organizing. Karpf (2012) argues that technology makes political action easier to access. While 
not all digital tactics are equal, technology changes the way that political advocacy organizations 
organize and respond political realities. He acknowledges that only a certain number of online 
organizations, what he calls ‘netroots,’ can be successful at the same time because they are 
competing for a similar audience (Karpf, 2012, p. 14). Moreover, Karpf (2012) argues that in this 
kind of environment, political views of participants may become polarized and acknowledges that 
these kinds of organizations are not the solution to complex political issues. He concludes, when 
it comes down to it, they do not have real bargaining power. Despite these limitations, online 
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affordances transformed the organizational layer of American politics including, fundraising 
strategies, work routines, and the ability to mobilize of supporters in new ways. Karpf (2012) 
argues that the internet enables political advocacy that moves fast and raises money quickly for 
specific, targeted and timely actions (p. 5-6). Organizations such as MoveOn, in the United 
States, use strategies such as native A/B testing which is crucial to their campaign efforts (Karpf, 
2012, p.35).  
Bimber et al. (2006 and 2012) further break down the structure of political organizing 
occurring in America, categorizing these kinds of organizations, or what they call collective 
action, by their mode of interaction and mode of engagement. The mode of interaction ranges 
from personal interaction among members building strong ties to impersonal interaction that 
emphasizes the expression of pursuits, interests and concerns without focusing on building 
relationships. The mode of engagement between participants ranges from highly institutional 
organizational structures that constrain the degree to which each member is allowed to participate 
to loose, horizontal flows of communication among people involved in the action (Bimber et al., 
2006). These understandings of organizational structure will help to compare how SHD operates 
to other cases. 
Concluding remarks 
Bringing these three parts, media and democracy, tactical media, and a new way of 
organizing, together reveals how broad the SHD case study is. The creation of SHD and their 
ongoing advocacy work must be considered within the contexts of Canada’s media relationship 
with the Conservative government. I have shown the traditional way of understanding 
mainstream media’s role in democracy and the importance of people being able to stay informed 
about and responsive to the government. The Canadian media environment has shifted, and 
continues to shift, giving more power to online action. Online political advocacy can be situated 
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in a history of tactical media. Finally, online tools allow SHD to organize in new ways. The 
analysis of the two campaigns show these affordances have developed over time allowing for 
more strategic and meaningful engagement – much more than ‘slactivism.’ Chapters Three and 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
In the following chapter I outline how I trace the trends and patterns of SHD’s work in 
order to compare the organization’s evolution. I have selected two campaigns from the history of 
SHD that demonstrate the evolution of their political campaigning:  -­‐ the 2011 Canadian federal election;  -­‐ the 2013 IndieGoGo funded television advertisement criticizing Canada’s 
Economic Action Plan (CEAP).  
The first campaign focuses on the dissemination of their anti-Harper message. The second 
campaign demonstrates the strategic approach to community building and the move to go beyond 
online campaigning moving onto television and working closely with their community to run an 
issue-based campaign model.  
I use interviews, newspaper content analysis and web sphere analysis to triangulate the 
research of each campaign. The web sphere analysis constructs a timeline of internet events, or 
traffic tags, to create a picture of how each campaign flows through the internet on a variety of 
platforms. The timeline helps to visualize the impact and influence SHD had. The spaces on 
which the traffic tags are shared include various social media platforms and blogs. Content 
analysis of media coverage during the two campaigns demonstrate how SHD’s campaigns have 
resonated in mainstream Canadian media. Interviews with key SHD staff and Canadian political 
consultants draw a through-line between the two campaigns and elaborate on the processes, 
challenges, tactics, and strategies used for each campaign. When brought together the three 
methods create an analysis of how SHD does their work and more importantly, how they created 
an online community of interest that shares information in new ways.  
In this chapter, I outline my research approach to the SHD case study; first, by justifying 
the choice of each campaign and second, by discussing the three methods that a triangulated. In 
subsequent chapters, I use these methods to draw conclusions regarding how SHD’s tactical 
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interventions engage in media hijacking, DIY tactics and humour in order to become part of the 
political information cycle. The methods show how SHD’s strategic, issue-based campaign had a 
different impact on both online networks and the media. Ultimately, these methods reveal both 
the intricate structures of the organization and the way in which SHD’s campaigns were shared. 
More broadly, they show how social media and online organization software are changing 
political advocacy in Canada. 
Part I: Two Campaigns 
Since the 2011 federal election, SHD engaged in multiple campaign. The two campaigns I 
have chosen to study represent a shift in style from tactical interventions to strategic organizing 
both with the goal of sharing information in a ‘political information cycle.’ The first campaign 
centers on the time leading up to and just after the 2011 federal election (April 11, 2011- May 4, 
2011). April 11 marks the launch of the SHD Tumblr site (www.shitharperdid.ca), their first 
Facebook post, and the day before posting of their first satirical YouTube video. SHD posted the 
final election themed YouTube video on May 1, one day before their last election themed 
Facebook post.6 The media published the last major news story about SHD’s election campaign 
on May 4, 2011. This end-date for analysis is in keeping with what I observe as a shift from 
“election mode” into a phase of redefining what the SHD community was and could become. 
The second campaign follows closely after the launch of the NationBuilder site, or ‘SHD 
2.0’ on April 2, 2013 and represents a shift in the way SHD engages with their work, strategies 
and technology. It examines one aspect of SHD’s response to the Canada’s Economic Action 
Plan (CEAP), which contained multiple campaigns including YouTube videos featuring 
“directors commentary” of the government ads, photo bombing CEAP billboards, the IndieGoGo 
television ad and a campaign to apply for the job of producing the next set of advertisements. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 SHD did not post on their Facebook page again until May 16, 2011 and it was not election related content.  
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This campaign was SHD’s first campaign launched using their new NationBuilder site which 
affords SHD a more coherent way to organize and respond to supporters. It represents a shift to 
thematic, issue-based campaigns that focus on crowdfunding, and moving their campaign efforts 
offline. This research hones in on SHD’s television commercial broadcast during Hockey Night 
in Canada, May 24, 2013, including the dates leading up to and following the national broadcast 
(April 24-June 1, 2013). The TV spot is important for SHD as it proved to both SHD organizers 
and their community that they could impact Canadian politics and offer new critiques about 
CEAP (Dales, 2014). The community created during the federal election needed to get behind the 
organization in a new way, not just share content on social media, but also donate funds and 
participate in creating content. The first day of this campaign, April 24, 2013, marks the launch 
of the IndieGoGo. The last day, June 1, 2013 follows the last major news coverage of the TV 
spot before SHD began the next portion of that campaign.  
These two campaigns offer perspective into the changing ways in which Canadian 
advocacy groups inform the ‘political information cycle.’ By raising funds on IndieGoGo, SHD 
took a different approach compared to their former YouTube tactics which cost less than $250. 
The new media strategy, including the community-oriented NationBuilder website and television 
campaign, is an important campaign to research when compared to the early issue-based tactics 
of SHD though both very differently allowed for knowledge sharing as a tool for healthy 
democracy. Finally, each of these campaigns follow the launch of two different SHD websites 
that highlight different strategies of online organizing. The 2011 Tumblr allowed for creating 
tactical, easy-to-share content that was highly satirical and pointed. The NationBuilder site 
allowed SHD to catalyze a community of supporters to work on a multi-component political 
campaign. These two campaigns highlight how new and social media afford different strategies 
for political advocacy. In particular, the differences between the campaigns highlight how SHD 
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asks their community for financial support directly, moved to a new medium (television), and 
brings their work into a ‘political information cycle’ in a different way.  
Part II: Web Sphere Analysis  
SHD’s campaigns are, for the purposes of this thesis, a ‘web sphere.’ The term refers to 
“a collection of dynamically defined digital resources spanning multiple web sites deemed 
relevant or related to a central theme or object” and offers cultural, social and political relations 
that can be analysed (Foot, 2010, p. 11-12). Web sphere analysis researches the objects that 
“enable analysis of communicative actions and relations between web producers and users 
developmentally over time” (Foot & Schneider, 2005, p. 118). This research is complex as the 
“boundaries of the sphere are likely to continuously find new sites to be included within it” and 
to be “dynamically re-established by both the researchers and the sites themselves” (Foot, 2010, 
p. 12). Foot & Schneider’s (2005) web sphere analysis is a multi-methodological approach 
investigating websites, hyperlinks, and conducting interviews with the content producers (p. 118-
119). This method seeks to “recognize the co-productive nature of new media – thus the duality 
of users and producers – and the potential for communicative actions and structures for action, 
especially on the web” (Foot & Schneider, 2005, p. 119). 
SHD’s influence is illustrated by defining and charting the web sphere through a traffic 
tag analysis. Traffic tags are unique identifiers such as YouTube URLS, hashtags, web URLs, 
etc. that when followed, map different sets of relationships among uploaded and shared web 
objects (text, images, videos, etc.), political actors (online partisans, political institutions, 
bloggers, etc.) and web-based platforms (social networking sites, search engines, political 
websites, blogs, etc.) (Elmer et al., 2012, p. 19). In this research, following tags  
begins with a process of identifying the key components in political-computer networking – 
actors, objects, and platforms – each which contain unique forms of ID, including user 
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generated tags. Once... each of these actors and objects [are identified] on the net, [one] can 
map the traffic, or the routes of such ID tags to determine how and where political 
campaigns circulate. (Elmer et al., 2012, p. 120).  
The process of tracing and tracking traffic tags reveals how SHD’s work travelled, what the 
content was and who made it. The impact they had on the political community in Canada 
becomes clearer by understanding the size, scope, and flows that occur within the web sphere 
created by SHD. Comparing traffic tags across two different campaigns reveals that this web 
sphere is much smaller, or perhaps more private, because of direct communication between the 
organization and supporter enabled by NationBuilder.  
The case study of the two campaigns is innovative because it draws the web sphere across 
time and different spaces online. I compiled the traffic tag results chronologically for both 
campaigns (see Appendix One and Four) charting how each political event moved across time 
and space in online media spheres (Elmer et al., 2012, p. 132). Traffic tag analysis offer two 
levels of analysis: below and beyond. This speaks to the organizational and political qualities of 
this research – below (the data and routes through which objects circulate and are published) and 
beyond “the capacity of content to represent, but also, more crucially in the online political 
context, to organize and spur action” (Elmer et al., 2012, p. 120). 
I identified tags by searching SHD profiles on social media, Facebook and YouTube, 
mentions on Reddit as well as Google and Google Blogs. I manually scraped each social media 
platform for content between the dates outlined. Posts on the SHD Facebook page, both by the 
moderators and others were catalogued chronologically. I input and sorted chronologically all the 
information in an Excel spreadsheet. I noted information such as SHD Facebook posts, links if 
shared, and the number of ‘likes,’ ‘shares,’ and comments.7 Due to the nature of Facebook, it is 
difficult to search for links and posts of SHD’s work within the site itself. Individual profiles that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 During the 2011 federal election Facebook did not have the option to ‘share’ posts.  
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may have shared relevant content are most likely to be limited by privacy settings and there is no 
way to escape the custom style searches, or ‘smart’ searches that Facebook provides.8 
Documenting the number of ‘likes’ and comments gives a record of how popular each post and 
well received it was. I used a similar technique for YouTube. All the videos posted on the SHD 
channel were noted including the title, post date, description provided, and number of comments, 
views, ‘thumbs up,’ and ‘thumbs down.’ I searched Reddit differently than the above platforms 
because information is not shared on a profile based page. Specific tags and terms were entered 
into the Reddit search bar. Similar, to the other platforms the following information was noted: 
content of the post, search term used, any links that were shared, subReddit on which it was 
posted, date, author, and number of ‘upvotes,’ ‘downvotes,’ popularity percentage, and 
comments.  
The next technique moves beyond social media platforms themselves to gather more 
nuanced information related to the sharing of SHD content. Google searches using the standard 
Google search tool and the Google Blogs search tool were conducted. I catalogued the results, 
taking note of the website, author, date, post details and any other information that might be 
important to contextualize the result. Table 2.1 shows terms that yielded results and Table 2.2 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For example, what I can search for on Facebook are things related to my profile based on my past participation, 
location, and connections.  
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Table 2.1: Traffic tag search terms9 





Nexus) Reddit  
“Hockey Night in Canada” “Economic Action Plan” 
Hockey Night in 
Canada” “Economic 
Action Plan” 




“Sh*t Harper Did” “Shit Harper Did” anti-harper Shit Harper Did 
“Shit Harper Did” Brigette DePape Shd.ca Shitharperdid.ca 
“shitharperdid.com” Sean Devlin Shit Harper Did shitharperdid.com 
Brigette DePape shitharperdid ShitHarperDid #shitharperdid 
ccgUbezuFHYY (Stephen Harper is an Evil Astronaut) WQm0t1v2wOM  shd.ca 
e0LpldpPwUU (Yoko Vs. ShitHarperDid.com)    
fUnFhCcNPoo (Wasted Vote)    
g0mucPiSgSw (Pokemon Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com)    
GqGbBXhNQeI (Softball Team Wins Canadian 
Election)    
KmthTKSWFWw (Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-
up Line)    
LSjc0C1bLJE (Celine Dion Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com)    
NBiD_VpG894 (Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear)    
njkuZywM0eg (Robot Army VS. Young Voters)    
ONPki_Qhlz0 (Ben Mulroney Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com)    
Sean Devlin    
Shd.ca    
shitharperdid    
TruthFool    
WQm0t1v2wOM (Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com)    
 
Table 2.2: Unsuccessful traffic tag searched on all platforms 
Cam Dales 
Cameron Reed 
d2BTGgO_sZM (RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to VANCOUVER SOUTH) 
F21LJ5QmUdw (ShitHarperDid Economic Action Plan TV Ad) 
iIWblq4ZOLI (RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to Edmonton!) 
Lz5v7wZpkj0 (You can help get this ShitHarperDid video on national TV!) 
Rubbish Harper Did  
S2G_TyNkm0c (We have until May 17th to share this video with as many people as possible) 
Sean Devlin 
sh*tharperdid 
Ua9TSmfYQJU (Rubbish HarperDid.com comes to KITCHENER-WATERLOO) 
umlsgkG9vAo (ShitHarperDid Economic Action Plan TV ad) 
zAbfJJJBLmA (SHD community raises $27,000+ in one week to buy last relevant ad on TV) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the first campaign a high number of videos were found in non-descript video embedding sites that provided no 
data regarding the date of the post of the number of views/visits the site had received. These were taken out of the 
timeline. 
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I created two timelines by tracing traffic tags across these platforms. I highlighted 
important tags, media coverage or posts made by SHD and popular items, in green; negative tags, 
that openly disagreed with the premise behind the SHD campaign, in red; and tags unrelated to 
SHD, in grey (see Appendix One and Four). The timelines provide a history of the SHD web 
sphere. These histories, illustrate the different SHD campaigns in each campaign. One focussed 
on informing and the other focused on organizing a community. The tags show how and where 
the object itself was shared but the interviews and content analysis shed more light on why they 
were shared. 
I approach this research with slight trepidation as simplistic problems hinder this kind of 
work. The objects of this research make it challenging, a concern shared with Barney who argues 
“emerging media are not just emerging; they are also emergent: ever unfinished, 
characteristically unstable, and always in process” (2011, p. 197). This suggests that any claims 
made regarding these kinds of new media are “provisional at best and invite refutation by 
technological change and the unpredictable choices made by the people who take up with it” 
(Barney, 2011, p.197). That said, looking at two campaigns of online interaction to make claims 
about the trajectory of Canadian political engagement should not to be passed by as a some sort 
of fad. Both campaigns may become outdated in their style, tactics and strategies yet regardless 
of this, during moment they caught the attention of Canadians and the media offering important 
political critique. They represent a moment of political frustration in Canada. However 
significant they are, there is a lack of archival documentation of various iterations of websites and 
limitations of search engines such as Google (Earl and Kimport, 2011). Karpf (2012) suggests 
that these kinds of research practices, 
vary widely and it is common to see outdated time stamps, the incremental addition of 
paragraphs at the top or bottom of stories, and deadline and URL changes to reflect new 
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angles as they emerge. Sometimes entire stories will simply be overwritten, even though 
the original hyperlink will be retained. (p. 213) 
This research acknowledges that these social media platforms are going to be quickly outdated by 
the next big social platform. Bearing in mind that online content is in constant flux and actively 
being deleted, relying on of content analysis of media coverage and interviews triangulated with 
the above methods provide more perspective and depth to this research.  
Part III: Content Analysis 
In order to get a more informed understanding of how the media represented SHD’s 
campaigns and how SHD influenced the ‘political information cycle,’ I did a content analysis of 
their media coverage. Further bolstering the above traffic tag timelines, searches of databases, 
Eurkeka.cc, Factiva, Proquest, and Lexus Nexus aggregated traditional media coverage of SHD 
on news broadcasts, newspapers, online news sites and related topics that Google and Google 
Blogs might have missed. The content analysis of the media coverage helped to show how SHD 
affected the information politics of Canadian political discourse. In the first campaign, the 
content analysis reveals that even though SHD may not have brought attention to all the issues 
they promoted (such as various issues on their 2011 Tumblr). The media coverage of their 
campaign brought their site to broader audiences outside their online community. In the second 
campaign, news coverage of SHD’s anti-CEAP television spot brought new issues into the 
broader, ongoing discussions about CEAP through their strategy of issue-based campaigning. 
This illustrates the changing ways SHD mobilized their community using a new set of tools and 
skills.  
Working from framing theory, I analysed the news media for the frame SHD was 
presented. Frames, according to Chong and Druckman, are “the process[es] by which people 
develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (2007, 
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p. 104). As Entman (1993) puts it, “frames call attention to some aspects of reality while 
obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions” (p. 55). The 
way in which the media chooses to present an issue or event determines the way in which the 
audience notices the story, understands and evaluates the problem, and chooses whether or not to 
act upon the issue (Entman, 1993, p. 54). Engaging framing theory is not to say there is a 
universal effect that all media have over audiences but that the presentation of the issue at hand 
can shape the way in people make judgements (Entman, 1993, p. 54).  
Content analysis of the news coverage of SHD during both events, especially when the 
two campaigns are compared and contrasted, reveals the frames in which their work was 
presented and helps to give context to how the public may have understood their campaigns. 
Entman urges content analysis be done from a framing paradigm in order to acknowledge how an 
audience may be reading a message, arguing the “major task of determining textual meaning 
should be to identify and describe frames” (Entman, 1993, p. 57). For the content analysis of the 
media coverage I uses the four steps laid out by Chong and Druckman. First I identified an issue 
or event – articles that covered SHD. Next, I identified a specific attitude – if SHD was 
represented in a positive, negative or neutral manner. Then, I used an inductive coding scheme 
created based on the set of frames identified for the issue – I focused on the context of the story. 
Chong and Druckman’s (2007) final step is to select the sources that to code (p. 106-107). I 
determined the sources by performing database searches using search terms found in Table 2.1 
and limiting the search period to the dates of each campaign. 
I coded each story for tone, frame and subject nothing whether or not the media 
referenced SHD in a positive, negative or neutral manner. This was determined by if the article 
actively criticized the organization and their work, more than just poking fun at their name, for 
example. I also recorded the frame of the story, for example, youth voting movements, social 
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media in the election, or in the case of the second campaign, CEAP failures or crowdfunding. I 
noted whether or not the issues that SHD was campaigning for or against were covered in the 
news story or if they were covered more generally as a political advocacy group (see Appendix 
Three and Seven). This is particularly interesting because though media coverage helped to raise 
a profile for SHD, their information campaigns did not necessarily get covered explicitly. I added 
the media coverage to the traffic tag timelines to paint a picture of each campaign in terms of 
how their campaigns flowed. 
Showing how SHD’s work is represented in the media demonstrates how media functions 
in the Canadian political sphere and the difficulty faced by political advocacy organizations to, as 
SHD puts it, “speak truth to power” (Why You Matter, n.d.). The issue SHD campaigned for 
were not necessarily translated into news coverage of their work. Comparing the coverage of 
each campaign against one another shows that SHD learned to communicate more clearly and 
that media shapes politics in Canada.  
Part IV: Interviews 
I interviewed key actors who were part of the emerging field of SHD. They include Cam 
Dales of SHD and Josh Stuart of cStreet Campaigns. Interviews triangulate the decision making 
processes over the course of SHD’s advocacy work and how their previous work compliments 
their ongoing strategies as an organization. They provide insight into how SHD staff use new 
media and technologies to promote their work. They also demonstrate the ways online social 
advocacy tools created for an American political sphere are translated into a Canadian context. 
This reveals personal motivations, keeping in mind that, interviews are “actively and socially 
assembled in the interview encountered (Briggs, 1986, in Holstein and Gubrium, 2002, p. 4). 
Interviewing the staff of SHD and cStreet Campaigns, serves “to shorten time-consuming data 
gathering processes” as they hold “practical insider knowledge” and can speak on behalf of “a 
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wider circle of players” (Bogner et al., 2009, p. 2). Speaking to Dales and Stuart lessened the 
work of finding background stories and past media interviews which serve a different purpose. 
Each interviewee was willing to participate which allowed for the opportunity to expand access 
and unearth new areas to the case (Bogner, et al., 2009, p. 2). Most importantly, as suggested by 
Bogner et al. (2009), expert interviews shed light on the details and intricacies of an otherwise 
abstract system (p.4) that to which I do not have access. 
 I first interview Josh Stuart, a staff person from cStreet Campaigns, the company that 
built the SHD NationBuilder site, on December 11, 2013. I then interviewed Cam Dales, a staff 
person and founder of SHD on April 18, 2014. I transcribed each interview word-for-word, 
highlighting ‘notable quotations’ that demonstrated important concepts and themes (as suggested 
in the work of Rubin & Rubin 2012, p. 191). I did not need to build a coding framework because 
there were only two interviews conducted and they did not need to be compared. The highlighted 
important quotes accounted for how particular decisions were made during SHD’s campaign and 
the motivations behind much of their work.  
These interviews offer perspectives on how political advocates perceive their work in a 
broader political sphere and understand their contribution to a media environment shaped by a 
‘political information cycle.’ The interview with Dales, connects the two campaigns, providing 
details about the organizational structure and how SHD made decisions at each point. Together 
the interviews, tell the story of how and why SHD was able out of an election period and into a 
long term organization with staff that runs issue-based campaigns, with offline components 
Interviews provide more information than what can be gleaned from the path traffic tags take 
through online networks and provide a vision of how SHD will continue into the future.  
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Part V: Triangulation of Methods  
These methods help to reveal the ways SHD motivates their audience, supporters, and 
community to share content in regards to media hijacking DIY media and political satire. The 
construction and analysis of the two traffic tag timelines, charts the differences between the two 
occasions in terms of internet tactics and strategies. The interviews provide a much more fruitful 
explanation for why and how SHD’s tactics and strategies have evolved. I conclude that political 
advocacy has changed in Canada because of SHD’s inside perspective on the transition into a 
long-term political advocacy group using issue-based campaign strategies, triangulated with the 
web sphere and news content analysis. I balance a micro view of SHD’s work with a broader 
understanding of how social media and online organizing software allow for different kinds of 
social organizing and political advocacy. 
By using the same approach for each campaign the subsequent chapters show that SHD 
has grown into a community. Starting with the 2011 federal election campaign, I use the above 
methods to create a timeline of digital activity and supplement it insider information from Cam 
Dales. The news analysis shows how SHD broke into the ‘political information cycle’ because of 
the success of the campaign. For second campaign, SHD’s anti-CEAP campaign, I have also 
created a timeline of digital activity that reveals that a very different approach to campaigning 
occurred. The interviews with Dales and Stuart reveal a heavy emphasis on finding new ways to 
organize their community around issue-based campaigns and the news analysis shows how 
through this SHD brought new political issues into main steam media coverage about CEAP. 
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Chapter Three: “Seriously? Tell me some other shit!” Shit Harper 
Did takes on the 2011 Federal Election 
“There was a general feeling, especially in Vancouver of a lot of complaining, a lot of 
dissatisfaction [with how] our generation was both being represented and being communicated 
to” reflects Cam Dales on the motivations behind Shit Harper Did (SHD). Dales and the other 
founders of SHD felt the Harper government ignored them. “People were kind of pissed off but… 
no one was doing anything” (Dales, 2014). So together, with his friends, Dales did something. 
The small group began crafting a satirical campaign that would become one of the most 
successful, non-partisan campaigns of the 2011 federal election (Francoli et al., 2011, p. 234).  
SHD was more than a group of “scruffy hipsters talking trash” as they were portrayed in 
the media (Houpt, 2011). SHD’s campaign, which includes a well-made, funny, catchy website 
and compilation of YouTube videos, allowed them, as members of the non-elite, to gain access to 
mainstream media coverage through avenues afforded by a ‘political information cycle’ 
(Chadwick 2013). They entered this cycle because the media reported on the website’s instant 
popularity. The site went ‘viral,’ as the media labelled it, not only because the content was funny 
but also because people cared about the issue at hand; online content is not shared passively 
(Benkler, 2006, p. 259). This campaign was possible because, as Karpf (2012) argues, technology 
changed the way that political advocacy organizations can organize and speak to political 
realities. He suggests the technology transformed the organizational layer of American politics. 
This chapter demonstrates that this phenomenon is also the case north of the border. SHD’s 
campaign was a tactical intervention into Harper’s electoral representation from a place of 
powerlessness. 
In this chapter I outline SHD’s 2011 federal election campaign – the tools they used and 
how the campaign travelled through online spaces. The timeline of SHD’s campaign 
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demonstrates the flow of the campaign, and the interviews paint a better picture of behind the 
scenes and the news analysis represents how SHD broke into, or gained coverage within, a 
‘political information cycle.’ Part I places the campaign within the context of the 2011 federal 
election and other social media political advocacy occurring at the time. Part II outlines the 
inspiration behind the site and the humorous campaign materials: the website, 
www.shitharperdid.com, and three batches of YouTube videos. Part III dissects how both aspects 
of the SHD campaign flooded Canadian social media, informing citizens about their stance on 
Stephen Harper. This outline of the traffic tag timeline allows for speculations upon how the 
campaign moved through various networks and garnered media attention. A news analysis of this 
coverage, in Part IV, helps to show how mainstream journalism represents SHD and how non-
elite members can influence how the media represents some aspects of the election. In the 
discussion in Part V I place this campaign in a body of literature that explains, more broadly, how 
it worked as a piece of online advocacy. The concluding reflections elaborate on how, even 
though Harper won a majority government, SHD can be read as a successful campaign and how 
the organizers dealt with the feeling of failure.  
This chapter focuses on the motivation behind this tactical campaign, unpacks its various 
elements, the networks in which they were shared, and the news coverage it received. If the 
measure of success for this campaign is the creation of a ‘viral’ phenomenon; SHD was 
successful. Yet, if the measure is the removal of Harper from power, ultimately, they failed. 
Neither measure is appropriate because, as I demonstrate in this Chapter, SHD represents a 
contemporary Canadian example of digital organizing, a new way of reaching out to their peers 
to build a community, and a demonstration of the new ways individuals can break into a 
changing news cycle. This case shows that the Canadian political advocacy scene has been 
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undergoing a major shift in the way in which it can do its work and illustrates the potential for 
different ways of organizing through the Internet. 
Part I Context: A Social Media Election 
On March 25, 2011, the CBC reported another election was around the corner. A majority 
of Members of Parliament had found the Canadian government in contempt of parliament for 
refusing to supply sufficient information for three key expenditures, “the cost of the F-35 fighter 
jets, their justice system reforms and their projections for corporate profits and tax rates” (CBC 
News, 2011). Prime Minister Harper’s rebuttal to what he called the Liberal, Bloc, and NDP 
“coalition,” was to force an unwanted election. Being that this would be the fourth election in the 
seven years prior, Harper said it was “an election Canadians clearly don’t want…Thus the vote 
today that disappoints me, will, I expect, disappoint Canadians” (CBC News, 2011). Scandal and 
a strained media relationship (as outlined in Chapter One) were still the talk of the nation as the 
stage was set for an election. This election, unlike elections in Canada’s near past, would be 
openly engaged with social media and digital activism.  
Political parties had watched the swell of online activity in United States electoral 
campaigns. Obama’s ground-breaking 2008 campaign led many to wonder when a similar 
campaign would happen in Canada. Political parties learned similar strategies and watching 
American parties prepare for the 2012 election. Francoli et al. argue that 2011 was the first 
“experimental social media election” (2011, p. 244). Most parties tested the water on social 
media platforms but did not use them to their full potential (Francoli et al., 2011, p. 244). For 
example, in terms of political presence on Facebook, the Liberal Party had the most candidates 
with pages, followed by the NDP, Green, Conservatives, Bloc and Pirate parties. Parties used the 
pages to pass on campaign information (Francoli et al., 2011, p. 232). Jack Layton’s NDP 
leadership page tended to focus on using the events feature of Facebook. The Liberal’s main page 
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had a question section for members to ask questions; however, it was only used twice. The 
Liberals did successfully run a discussion board on Facebook that was well used. Beyond this, 
there were few examples of political parties using social media, Facebook in particular, 
interactively (Francoli et al., 2011, pp. 232-33).  
The 2011 federal election did see an upswell of citizens participating online in a variety of 
ways even though political parties did not integrate social media into their campaigns in a 
substantial way. At this time, especially in the United States, sites like Change.org, MoveOn.org, 
and Avaaz – urging online, political, citizen actions and organization – were continuing to gain 
popularity. In their reflection on social media use in the 2011 federal election, Francoli et al. 
point especially to the use of YouTube and other online videos suggesting that the most 
“interesting and innovative use of video did not come from the party campaigns themselves, but 
from citizens” (2011, p. 234). Their research points to two noteworthy events: videos of student 
vote mobs (see Table 3.1) that spread across Canadian universities and SHD’s campaign 
(Francoli et al., 2011, p. 234). Reilly also points to other social media use in the 2011 federal 
election such as: the devoted anti-Harper group “Enough Harper,” a group that shared various 
videos and images that had about 2,000 followers on Facebook and 1,600 followers on Twitter 
(Reilly, 2011, p. 504); and the women behind the “It’s Over Steve” YouTube Videos that were 
quite popular. Episode 001 of “It’s Over Steve,” posted on April 10, 2011 got 68,227 views, 
Episode 002, posted April 11, 2011 got 14,414 views, and Episode 003, posted April 16, 2011 
got 3,440 views (itsoversteve 2011). During this election there were also numerous fake Twitter 
accounts satirizing political candidates, and amateur video productions that participated in online 
political commentary (Reilly, 2011p. 508). 
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Table 3.1: University vote mob YouTube videos posted during 2011 federal election  
University	   Date Posted	   Views*	  
University of Guelph	   31-Mar-11	    47, 883 views 	  
University of Victoria	   07-Apr-11	    29,484 views 	  
McMaster University	   07-Apr-11	    13,809 views 	  
University of Ottawa	   11-Apr-11	    18,541 views 	  
McGill University	   15-Apr-11	    21,388 views 	  
Carlton University	   18-Apr-11	    7,705 views	  
Memorial University	   18-Apr-11	    7,756 views	  
University of Waterloo	   20-Apr-11	    3, 201 views 	  
University of British Columbia	   20-Apr-11	    8,805 views	  
Simon Fraser University	   22-Apr-11	    3,004 views	  
* Views relevant as of June 25, 2014. 
Francoli et al. insist that the people who engage in such online activities are “most likely 
already committed partisans or voters who would have been more likely to cast ballots whether 
the technology existed or not” (Francoli et al. 2011, p. 242). They are “confident in concluding 
that social media did not play as important a role in terms of influencing the results of the 
election as traditional media did, notably television” (2011, p. 242). Knowing the results of the 
2011 election, that Harper’s Conservative’s won a majority does not tell the whole story. I argue 
that SHD is politically significant because together, with many of their peers who may not have 
been interested in politics (Dales, 2014), they publically voiced dissent for Stephen Harper. SHD, 
and these other campaigns, did receive mainstream media coverage, which in turn influenced “the 
tenor and tone of the media coverage and became part of the election narrative” (2011, p. 242). 
This election narrative, I argue, is key to showing the importance of this kind of online 
participation. The media coverage of SHD is the focus of Part IV which demonstrates how SHD 
joined the mainstream, political conversations occurring offline.  
	  	   	  41	  
Part II Motivation and Inspiration: Building Shit Harper Did 
According to Dales, back in 2011, Canadian youth, especially the group in Vancouver 
behind SHD, were dissatisfied, disappointed, and ultimately “pissed off” with the leadership of 
Harper and his Conservative party (Dales, 2014). Dales remembers his frustration with the 
federal Conservatives for completely misunderstanding “what our core values are as a group and 
as a group that is posed to inherit the problems of the previous generation and also [that the 
Conservatives] have really no idea how to communicate” (Dales 2014). They were angry and got 
active. Co-creator of SHD, Sean Devlin, who had his own advocacy and campaign firm, 
Truthfool, approached Dales, a print designer, to help with the SHD project. Devlin showed 
Dales the website “What the fuck has Obama done so far?” and suggested that they build a site 
that would do the exact opposite. According to Dales, Devlin wanted to build a website that 
would bring together “four years of bullshit policy- and decision-making, especially around a 
couple of key issues” (Dales, 2014). Devlin gathered a group of “artists, musicians, designers, 
event people, people that you might generally term creative class types, really early career or 
people still in school” of whom brought different skills to the table (Dales, 2014). This included 
Cameron Reed, who was working at Radar DBB, a social media marketing company, as well as 
including some comedians. The group decided how they could “serve this content in the fastest, 
easiest, most fun way” (Dales, 2014). They determined that key to the project would be its sense 
of humour as well as its usability. This section will further unpack the inspiration for this site, 
SHD’s satirical approach, and both the website and YouTube content.  
Online copy cats 
 “What the fuck has Obama Done so far?” was a jumping-off point for SHD. The creators 
built the site in response to the criticism Obama received for his perceived lack of action on his 
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campaign promises. The American creators wanted to inform people that he had actually done 
work (Snyder, 2010).  
Image 3.1: “WhatTheFuckHasObamaDoneSoFar.com” 
 
Image from: http://web.archive.org/web/20101104014754/http://whatthefuckhasobamadonesofar.com/. 
The SHD organizers took this informing model, with its easy-to-share, simple website 
layout, tailored jokes, and links to media coverage, and turned its positive attitude on its head. 
SHD reminded Canadian citizen’s “What the fuck Stephen Harper [has] done so far.” 
Creators of “What the fuck has Obama done so far?” based their site on the joke website 
“Barack Obama Is Your New Bicycle,” built in 2008, that would generate random non-sequiturs. 
The simple layout site with silly phrases such as “Barack Obama left a comment on your blog” or 
“Barack Obama danced with your mom at your sister’s wedding” received a large enough 
following that it led to a book deal and copy-cat sites with versions for Hilary Clinton, Sarah 
Palin, John McCain, Michelle Obama, and Ron Paul (Dubs, 2009). This transference of style 
from one site to the next – this sort of re-make and do-it-yourself culture – empowers people to 
produce their own political critiques (Jones, 2010, p. 13). 
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Image from: http://web.archive.org/web/20101104014754/http://whatthefuckhasobamadonesofar.com/. 
The SHD organizers took this informing model, with its easy-to-share, simple website 
layout, tailored jokes, and links to media coverage, and turned its positive attitude on its head. 
SHD reminded Canadian citizen’s “What the fuck Stephen Harper [has] done so far.” 
Creators of “What the fuck has Obama done so far?” based their site on the joke website 
“Barack Obama Is Your New Bicycle,” built in 2008, that would generate random non-sequiturs. 
The simple layout site with silly phrases such as “Barack Obama left a comment on your blog” or 
“Barack Obama danced with your mom at your sister’s wedding” received a large enough 
following that it led to a book deal and copy-cat sites with versions for Hilary Clinton, Sarah 
Palin, John McCain, Michelle Obama, and Ron Paul (Dubs, 2009). This transference of style 
from one site to the next – this sort of re-make and do-it-yourself culture – empowers people to 
produce their own political critiques (Jones, 2010, p. 13). 
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Image 3.2: “BarackObamaIsYourNewBicycle.com”  
 
Image from: http://web.archive.org/web/20081103004313/http://www.barackobamaisyournewbicycle.com/.  
SHD remade the American website in a way that would be culturally relevant for young 
Canadians. This transference of tactics is important to note as it is part of online, political culture. 
Political tactics and strategies circulate as modules across campaigns and borders (Tarrow, 1994). 
They are modular in the sense that they are “capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees 
of self-consciousness to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a 
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations” (Anderson, 1991, p. 4).  
This copying behaviour is encouraged online. Chadwick suggests that “parties, interest 
groups and social movement can and do borrow from each other’s typical organizational and 
mobilization repertoires” (2007, p. 284). Chadwick uses the term “repertoires” to refer to 
organizational forms or tactics adopted by similar organization (2007, p. 284). SHD’s campaign 
tactics, specifically their website layout and style, highlight the kinds of tactics, designs, and 
campaign tools that circulated as modules or repertoires in 2011. In the next chapter, I speak to 
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the different kinds of software and strategies that were circulating in the political advocacy 
sphere in 2013.  
Using humour: “If I was Rita MacNeil’s Back-Up Dancer and I asked you to 
Vote…”10  
Like the websites that came before www.shitharperdid.com, humour was key to its 
success. This comedic tone was also integral to the YouTube videos that featured actors who 
would comically note that they were not celebrities like Howie Mandel, Celine Dion, or Rick 
Moranis. They would also refer to Canadian television shows such Breaker High, Degrassi, and 
Mr. Dress-up, allowing the audience, their peers, to feel they could relate to the content. For 
example, one video quips,  
If I was Sarah McLachlan, and I asked you to vote? Would you do it? If I was Babar King 
of the Elephants, would you be confused? If I was Ben Mulroney, that would be pretty 
great… We are not celebrities, but we still hope you will vote. (a.ShitHarperDid, 2011) 
The references suited the 20-something youth they were targeting. In the videos, SHD 
interspersed jokes between lines about Stephen Harper’s policies recounted in a humorous way. 
For example, in the video “Stephen Harper is an Evil Astronaut,” an actor claims that Harper was 
“the first Prime Minister to arrest over 1,000 Canadians all at once. And most of them weren’t 
charged, so I guess that was just practice for when real crimes happen” (c. ShitHarperDid, 2011). 
SHD crafted jokes for the website with a similar tone such as, “Stephen Harper loves handcuffs, 
but not, you know, the sexy kind…” referring to G20 arrests (Kempton, 2011) and “Stephen 
Harper rewrote history… with a racist crayon” referring to a speech in which he denied Canada’s 
colonial past (Murphy, 2011). Organizers understood the audience of young Canadians for whom 
they created the website and YouTube videos by including inside jokes riddled with cultural 
references to ease them into thinking about political issues that faced voters. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “… would you ask me who Rita MacNeil is and why she needs back-up dancers? Or would you just go and vote?” 
Line from the first SHD video (b. ShitHarperDid, 2011). 
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Dales (2014) recalls that this tactic was conscious. Especially for him, having hilarious 
content was essential for this site to take off. As SHD built the site, satire became an obsession 
for the team. Dales (2014) explains: 
We were really severe on how critical we were being of the joke content. So we were 
taking these news headlines and then rewriting jokes, you know, one liners for them and 
those went through a lot of iterations. That was a huge amount of work that went into that 
stuff. I really think it was vindicating for me personally. I can’t speak for anyone else at the 
organization… [for me] it stood as a reminder that content still is the thing that rules. Your 
dissemination strategy is totally important but if the content isn’t there it doesn’t matter and 
it won’t matter, at least in my opinion. I can’t say that definitely, but for me with out that 
stuff it doesn’t matter how much effort you put into that dissemination strategy and that 
amplification strategy. 
Dales’ insisted that the jokes be well-crafted speaks to the way in which political satire works, 
and the campaign’s success aligns with the growing prominence of political satire. The popular 
success of shows like The Daily Show with John Stewart and The Colbert Report on American 
televisions have blurred the line between entertainment and information (Boler & Turpin, 2010, 
p. 383; Jones, 2010, p. 19). With their combination of headlines and joke material, SHD fits into 
this “fake news genre” that is a “hallmark of contemporary popular culture (Reilly, 2011, p. 507). 
Jones argues that this blurred line leads people to question the “reality” and “truth” that news 
media constructs, challenging the public to question news that is taken for granted as true (2010, 
p. 19-20). SHD’s campaigns challenge assumptions about Harper’s time in parliament. 
The profanity associated with the site, alienated some viewers of the content, reinforcing 
their support for right-wing parties (Elmer 2011 quoted in Reilly, 2011, p. 507). Reilly points out 
evidence of this dissent in the comments sections of some of SHD’s campaign (2011, p. 507). 
That being said, the number of hits SHD received in the first few days alone vindicates Dales’ 
instinct to create effective political satire. Even with the risk of alienation or reinforcing 
conservative values, Tinic (2009) asserts that the use of political satire allows groups, such as 
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SHD, who exist outside of powerful circles to resist the status quo (p. 168). As Boler & Turpin 
(2010) indicate, jokes allow groups entry into political discourse by say that which is left unsaid 
in more serious mediums such as the news media (p. 384). They could critique the media and the 
ruling party without repercussions that may have come from more professional media sources.  
Shit Harper Did: The 2011 tactical campaign  
No one would have laughed at SHD’s jokes had they not been shared on the Internet. This 
portion of the chapter will outline how SHD circulated their jokes through their website and the 
YouTube videos. The campaign relied heavily on their social media presence, especially Twitter 
and Facebook, the latter of which is accounted for in Part III.11 SHD also dabbled in on-the-
ground campaign work including club specials with participating DJ’s across Canada during the 
early voting dates, and local get-out-the-vote events in four swing ridings. The focus of this 
research is on the spread of their online campaign. This is not to belittle the important milestone 
of being able to move offline but rather to keep this research manageable and focused.  
The campaign centres on the website www.shitharperdid.com.12 Devlin’s required the 
website to be “something that is super sharable and kind of fun to use and play with” (Dales, 
2014). They built the simple website on Tumblr, an easy-to-use blog platform, founded in 2007. 
As described in the news magazine Forbes more than just a hosting site, “Tumblr harnesses the 
enthusiasm around a particular topic and coalesces into a community” (Savitz, 2013). This 
enthusiasm is easy to bring together through the tagging and reblogging features that are 
prominent and straight-forward to use. Though now only accessible through screen shots and 
internet archives, the Tumblr version of www.ShitHarperDid.com had a simple layout.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This research was unable to account for the Twitter activity due to the sheer amount of Tweets and no access to 
SHD’s Twitter archive. 
12 I relied on screen shots found in Google’s Image Search because the site is no longer live. 
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Image 3.3: “ShitHarperDid.com” Harper’s Mayonnaise 
 
Image from: http://www.canadiandesignresource.ca/digital/shitharperdid-com/.  
The site included links to “Watch our Videos” (linking to their YouTube channel), “Follow us on 
Twitter,” and had an embedded Facebook “Like” feature. There was also an option to sign up for 
a newsletter for notifications of future videos which presumably this list became imperative to 
their 2013 campaign. At the bottom of the page a set of links to the Liberal, NDP, Bloq 
Quebecois, and Green Parties’ respective sites. Though not affiliated with any other party, SHD 
encouraged visitors to educate themselves about what they called “BETTER options.” By 
clicking the “Seriously? Tell me some other shit” button, the layout of the site remained the same 
while the quotation, description, and linked news sources would cycle through 27 other 
statements (Reilly, 2011, p. 507).  
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Image 3.4: “ShitHarperDid.com” Egomaniacal Harper 
Image from: http://canadaartsconnect.com/magazine/2011/04/how-artists-are-using-social-media-to-influcence-the-
vote/.  
SHD’s website, like “What the fuck has Obama done so far?” would scroll through 
satirical quips about Harper’s record. Unlike the American counter-part, 
www.ShitHarperDid.com would highlight flaws in the national leader’s administration rather 
than successes. Some of the issues that the site would generate included: Harper’s denial of 
Canada’s colonial past (Murphy, 2011), weakening the regulations of the Canadian food 
inspection agency (Kempton, 2011), removing the portraits of past Prime Ministers in the 
hallways of the House of Commons and replacing them with his own (Coleman, 2011), 
rebranding the Government of Canada to “The Harper Government” (Mira Catherine, 2011), the 
G20 security budget and arrests data (Nolan, 2011), and the lack of action towards providing safe 
drinking water on Canadian reservations (Ross P, 2011). These jokes linked to news sites 
confirming their facts. Finally, the sketch of Harper with a kitten pokes fun of the “softer side” of 
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Stephen Harper, repurposing Image 3.5, released by Harper’s media team, the site ridicules his 
well-sculpted media persona.  




SHD also made a series of YouTube videos. In total, they created 15 video. They made 
the videos one morning in Vancouver. SHD organizers gathered about 20-30 people, each with a 
variety of skills, to help film, act in, and produce the videos. The whole affair only cost them 
approximately $250 of their pooled resources (Dales, 2014). The YouTube videos, like the 
website, were easily shared, humorous, and strategically named. SHD released three batches of 
videos at different times during the campaign. The first batch coincided with the launch of the 
website on April 12, 2011. SHD released the second batch of videos over the course of the 2011 
campaign period. The third batch was SHD’s last push to get-out-the-vote in key swing ridings 
that non-Conservative candidates had the chance to win against Conservative candidates by a 
narrow margin. The first two batches of videos followed the same aesthetic, with actors 
delivering lines in front of a white screen, shot from the chest up (see Image 3.6). 
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Image 3.6: Screen Shot of “Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com”  
 
The first batch of videos ended with a title screen promoting the website (Image 3.7). They used 
celebrity names, such as Celine Dion, Ryan Gosling, Ben Mulroney, and Pokémon in their titles, 
but not the celebrities themselves, encouraging people to get to the polls, citing the low voter 
turnout that brought Stephen Harper to power in the previous election. The videos do not get into 
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Image 3.7: Screen Shot of the end title screen of the first batch of SHD videos 
	  
The second batch of videos had the same aesthetic, with actors standing in front of a 
white screen with clips of them cut together delivering jokes as well as urging young people to 
both vote and visit the website or educate themselves about Stephen Harper’s political reputation. 
However, rather than ending with the image of Harper with a kitten the title screen features the 
website URL in bold white on a purple background. 
SHD geared the third batch of videos towards four specific cities (Edmonton, Kitchener-
Waterloo, Saanich-Gulf Islands and Vancouver South). They did not feature any live actors or 
video clips but instead included a compilation of still images illustrating a narration encouraging 
people to come out to their on-the-ground events in the riding. The images used included screen 
shots of the SHD website, local landmarks in each city, and silly pictures that went along with the 
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Image 3.8: Screen shot of “Go away bees!” in “RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to 
SAANICH-GULF ISLANDS!”  
 
Image 3.9: Screen shot of swing riding NDP candidate in “RubbishHarperDid.com Comes 
to EDMONTON!”  
 
Each of videos in the third batch ended with a title screen featuring the URL 
RubbishHarperDid.com referring to the video “Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear” from the second 
batch that urged voters to tell their grandparents about the SHD website (in a less profane way).  
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Part III Traffic Tag Timeline: The Dissemination of SHD 
ShitHarperDid.com’s content and shareability were key to the spread of campaign 
through various communities online. This section focuses on what happened after the website 
went live on April 11, 2011, until just after the federal election May 4, 2011. This section 
outlines the organizers personal experience with launching the website, which was so 
overwhelmed with hits on the first day it crashed. This is followed by the results from the traffic 
tag research showing where and when each component of the campaign spread.  
Disemination without a strategy 
Around 3 AM April 11, 2011, SHD organizers set website live and sent links to the site, 
YouTube videos and Facebook page to a group of 15-30 friends of the core-team (Dales, 2014). 
When asked about the strategy for the website launch and their plan to gain a following, Dales 
(2014) explained,  
Honestly our strategy was at that point: get the thing… live on the web, and get a Facebook 
account for it, and then try to send it out to as many people as we can. But we tried like a 
few people that night and we expected that we were going to do a push that following 
morning and it turned out that push ended up not to be necessary but that was kind of it. I 
am pulling the curtain up a little bit but our strategy was really quite basic.  
By the time they woke up, the site had already spread through their friend’s broad networks, and 
that one email was enough to crash the site by the end of the next day. According to Dales, it was 
a huge surprise when they realized they would not have to push their content on social media at 
all; witth high-quality content, dissemination happened on its own.  
Suddenly, SHD not only had a cross-country network of ‘tech-support,’ but also had 
clogged the social media news feeds Canada-wide. After the site crashed, the server the team 
quickly migrated the content to new servers. “A bunch of people around the country who were 
colleagues, really loose colleagues, who were in the activism world who stepped in and helped us 
in a really huge way,” offering to load the content onto their own servers (Dales, 2014). The 
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Reddit community also helped them sort through the debacle. Dales recalls that the site had even 
been backed up in Europe by someone who had heard about them on Reddit (2014). Reflecting 
this early success, Dales said that Cameron Reed, another original co-creator of the site,  
had a really proud moment that on the day that our servers went down because every single 
person on Radar [where Reed was working at the time in social media] on their social 
media feeds were clogged with our content. That means it was coming through from 
everywhere so that was really great. (2014)  
They did not control the spread of their work. SHD’s content spoke for itself and they had 
successfully targeted their audience.  
Shit Harper Did’s timeline of social sharing 
When SHD organizers awoke, their site had spread across the internet and social media 
with an initial spike then a gradual buzz of activity. The traffic tag timeline shows when and 
where the media created by SHD was shared. It contextualizes each video, each piece of news 
coverage, and links to/mentions of SHD content in a larger story of internet sharing. The timeline 
provides an overview of, what was coined by the media as a ‘viral’ phenomenon, actually looks 
like. Appendix One shows the order, by date, where I found each traffic tag. By searching for 
traffic tags (see Chapter Two for a further explanation of this term) I found the number of times 
links to each video and to site were shared or mentioned. Appendix One illustrates that the broad 
audience and networks that shared SHD content extending beyond social media. Figure 3.1 
demonstrates the overall pattern of sharing. I produced the graph using the timeline (Appendix 
One) described in the methodology. It compares SHD’s social media activity (posts on Facebook 
and YouTube) with the columns representing the places SHD content was shared and how often. 
There is a spike in activity after each post which shows how the online community responded to 
each new SHD post. 
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Figure 3.1: SHD content sharing by platform and time 
 
 
On the first day of the launch April 11, 2011, a huge spike in traffic would ultimately lead 
to the website crashing. I located links to the shitharper.com and two YouTube videos on three 
blogs, two forums, and Tegan and Sara’s fans’ Tumblr page (Appendix One). By April 13, 2011, 
just over 24 hours later, SHD posted on their Facebook wall: “Sorry, everyone. We just found out 
we’ve had ONE MILLION HITS since 8am. We’ll be up and running again soon” (Appendix 
One). The Facebook comment received 160 likes – a small number compared to what would 
come. Later that same day SHD posted that the number of likes of the Facebook page had grown, 
10,000 - Thank you! More than 2-dozen young Canadians have volunteered their time to 
prepping this for the past 2 weeks. Thank you for embracing it so quickly! We have lots 
more in the works -- stay tuned and spread the word. PS. the word is “VOTE.” (Appendix 
One) 
The post acquired 325 likes. In one day SHD reached 10,000 people. That day there people 
posted seven times on Reddit (the most popular getting 45 “upvotes”), and linked to SHD content 
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in 31 other networks ranging from the United Church of Canada’s Wonder Café community, a 
BC sports bike forum, MidnightPoutine.ca, HeartyMagazine.com, and the list goes on (Appendix 
One).  
That same day The Globe and Mail embedded “Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com” on their site (“Hipsters tout ShitHarperDid.com”) preceding the first 
newspaper article about the viral site (more later regarding the media content and representation). 
The Globe and Mail embedded video was the highest viewed video in the first batch. There is no 
way of confirming that this led to the spike in viewership but there is a possibility this was the 
reason it received well over 132,159 more views than the other SHD videos.13 Table 3.2 
illustrates this bump in views, the breakdown of the first batch of videos, and the number of 
views, comments, shares, thumbs up, and thumbs down.  
Table 3.2: First batch of YouTube videos posted by ShitHarperDid14 
































Celine Dion Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com 
(LSjc0C1bLJE)	   12-Apr-11	   60,809	   185	   158	   562	   43	  
Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com 
(WQm0t1v2wOM)	   12-Apr-11	   225,582	   749	   639	   1,673	   205	  
Ben Mulroney Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com 
(ONPki_Qhlz0)	   12-Apr-11	   93,423	   211	   245	   509	   44	  
Pokemon Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com 
(g0mucPiSgSw)	   12-Apr-11	   54,884	   127	   40	   410	   28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ryan Gosling’s jaw-dropping beauty and high-brow acting may have also misled fans to this video while searching 
for Ryan Gosling content on YouTube. Extrapolating conclusions from this kind of research is difficult.  
14 Views and shares for Table 3.2. 3.3 and 3.5 are relevant as of January 31, 2014. Comments, Thumbs Up, and 
Thumbs Down relevant as of June 6, 2014. I did not account for two videos that were two parts of the television 
show “The Party”, that aired towards the end of the election period on CTV News Channel (CTV Staff, 2011). The 
show was only mentioned in one media piece, there were no posts on Facebook about it, nor did Cam Dales mention 
it. 
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The first batch of videos received 60,809, 225,582, 93,423, and 54,884 views each, 
respectively – higher than many of the Vote Mob videos or most videos shared by a political 
party. These numbers are not to be dismissed when compared with other “viral phenomena” on 
YouTube – Hiltz (2011) reports that “among its videos [Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com] was the one most shared by Canadians on YouTube Wednesday – the 
website’s fifth most-viewed video nationwide.” Referring back to Table 3.1, the videos received 
substantially more views than the university student vote mobs. Also, even the most popular “It’s 
Over Steve” video, mentioned earlier, only got 68,227 views. SHD was most definitely the most 
popular Canadian political group posting on YouTube at the time. As with all subsequent videos, 
the first batch of videos received the majority of views within the first days of being posted. An 
example of the instantaneous popularity of the one of the first video’s posted is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3.  
Figure 3.2: “Celine Dion Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com” Daily Views 
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Figure 3.3: “Celine Dion Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com” Cumulative Views 
 
On April 14, 2011, SHD reported to their Facebook community that, 
Last night we asked you if we could hit 10,000 by this morning... about to hit 20,000 - 
Thank you! Please “Suggest To Friends” Will have some fun stuff for you to play with later 
today. (Appendix One) 
Seven more Reddit posts were found referring to “Shit Harper Did,” and 42 more posts on blogs 
and forums linking to SHD material. The most noteworthy among the bunch, Adbusters and The 
Tyee posted links to SHD content that would have had much higher readership than the 
aforementioned blogs. Four news articles mentioned SHD that first day, which I outlined in the 
next section. The next day, April 15, 2011, the media published six more news articles and SHD 
posted on Facebook, 
We passed 3.5 million hits in the first 36 hours! The national media is embracing our 
message, with some reporting that we’ve “changed the game”...and it’s all because of YOU. 
We put this thing together, but it is your overwhelming support that gives it true strength. 
New videos on the way... (Appendix One) 
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On April 18, 2011 SHD started promoting the first of the second batch of YouTube 
videos, posting on Facebook, 
NEW VIDEO! Not all that serious. But we will be releasing 1 a day this week! Others with 
a more serious focus. No matter where you are in Canada please join us for ShitperDid.com 
PRESENTS Vote Responsively, Dance Recklessly. (Appendix One) 
Though they ultimately did not post a video every day, they did post consistently. April 19, 20, 
22, 23, and 28, 2011 SHD released new YouTube they had created. These videos, as shown in 
Table 3.3, ranged in views from 12,102 to 186,063.  
Table 3.3: Second batch of YouTube videos posted by ShitHarperDid 
































Yoko VS Harper –	  ShitHarperDid.com 
(e0LpldpPwUU)	   17-Apr-11	   46,941	   201	   247	   496	   57	  
Stephen Harper is an Evil Astronaut 
(ccgUbezuFHY)	   19-Apr-11	   66,194	   475	   456	   832	   135	  
Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line 
(KmthTKSWFWw)	   20-Apr-11	   186,063	   968	   798	   1,466	   316	  
Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear 
(NBiD_VpG894)	   22-Apr-11	   23,024	   164	   62	   182	   36	  
Softball Team wins Canadian Election 
(GqGbBXhNQeI)	   23-Apr-11	   15,686	   100	   72	   166	   11	  
“Wasted Vote”	  Shane Koyczan	  
(fUnFhCcNPoo)	   26-Apr-11	   42,015	   417	   311	   720	   89	  
Robot Army VS Young Voters (njkuZywM0e)	   28-Apr-11	   12,102	   117	   78	   177	   17	  
The first video, “Yoko VS Harper” (44,941 views), poked fun at Harper’s rendition of the 
Beatle’s “Imagine,” and prompted voters to go to advanced polls. The video also promoted the 
connections SHD had made with DJs across Canada, offering advanced poll deals at various 
clubs across Canada. The more serious content that SHD referred to on Facebook may have 
alluded to the next video, posted on April 19, 2011, “Stephen Harper is an Evil Astronaut” 
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(66,194 views), which focused on the charge against the Prime Minister for being in contempt of 
Parliament. The actors in the video claim the election was called “because Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper violated the democratic rights of Canadian citizens, like you! Don’t believe it? 
Go to ShitHarperDid.com.”  
SHD posted another video on April 20, 2011 and Sean Devlin appeared on a podcast – 
Alert! Radio – to talk about SHD’s work. On the podcast, Devlin says that 2/3 of young 
Canadians do not listen to the news, they do not vote, and are not following the political events in 
the country. He claims that by targeting youth in an entertaining way, SHD could increase 
interest in voting. In the midst of the campaign, Devlin felt that SHD was a success because there 
were over four million page views on the site in the first 72 hours. According to Devlin, by this 
time the media had embraced them. He argues that www.shitharperdid.com reminds people that 
Harper is a minority leader that goes about his controversial actions in quiet or covert ways 
(Episode 182, 2011). Though Devlin is correct that the media ‘embraced’ them in terms of 
covering the campaign, in the next section I argue that the mainstream news media did not do 
SHD justice in its news coverage of the issues toward which the site is dedicated.  
The second most popular video, “Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line,” also 
posted on April 20, 2011 eventually attracted 186,063 views. (The line, by the way, is “I’m not 
Stephen Harper”). It focused on the funding cuts to women’s advocacy groups. As with the 
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Figure 3.4: Daily views of “Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line” 
	  
As Appendix Two shows, when SHD posted this video on their Facebook page, the link 
got 833 “likes” and 54 comments. This post, in bold in Appendix Two, is also the second-most 
“liked” comment on SHD’s Facebook page before the election. This table also illustrates the 
variation of “likes” SHD content received over the course of the entire campaign.  
The popularity of “Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line” and “Ryan Gosling Not 
Endorsing ShitHarperDid” in terms of view counts were also the most popular videos tags found 
in Appendix One. Table 3.4 shows the frequency of each traffic tag found over the course of the 
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Table 3.4: Traffic tags in order of number of results  
Number of 
results	   Tag (followed by video title)	  
71	   "Shit Harper Did"	  
51	   ShitHarperdid	  
35	   ShitHarperdid.com	  
24	   WQm0t1v2wOM (Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com)	  
19	   Shit Harper Did	  
17	   KmthTKSWFWw (Canadian Women's Favourite Pick-up Line) 
10	   e0LpldpPwUU (Yoko Ono VS ShitHarperDid.com	  
6	   ccgUbezuFHY (ShitHarperDid is an Evil Astronaut)	  
7	   fUnFhCcNPoo (“Wasted Vote”	  by Shane Koyczan)	  
6	   LSjc0C1bLJE (Celine Dion Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com)	  
6	   ONPki_Qhlz0 (Brian Mulroney Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com)	  
5	   (a)ShitHarperDid	  
3	   Sh*tHarperDid	  
2	   Sean Devlin	  
2	   njkuZywM0eg (Robot Army VS. Young Voters)	  
2	   g0mucPiSgSw (Pokemon Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com)	  
2	   ShitHarperdid.ca	  
1	   GqGbBXhNQeI (Softball Team wins Canadian Election)	  
1 NBiD_VpG894 (Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear) 
 
As the election carried on, Figure 3.1 shows that the sharing lessened but did not stop. 
SHD released the last three videos in the second batch on April 23, 2011. The video “Stephen 
Harper’s Greatest Fear” asked viewers both to phone their grandparents and tell them why they 
would not be voting for Harper, and to send them to their “old-folk friendly website,” 
“RubbishHarperDid.” Though it only received 23, 060, views the video is notable for SHD’s 
awareness both of their young audience, and that their use of profane language might have some 
turned some people away from their work. On April 26, 2011, “Softball Team wins election” 
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(15,698 views) was a get-out-the-vote plea that informed viewers that some ridings in the 
previous election had only been won by 20 votes (“there were more kids on Degrassi!”), 
reminding the community that its votes can count. The last video, “Robot Army VS. Young 
Voters,” posted April 28, 2011, had 12,121 views and warned youth of false polls that might be 
reporting troubling numbers. They reminded voters that polls rely on land-lines, and that they 
were therefore not representative of youth views, encouraging voters to prove the polls wrong: 
“The polls won’t decide this election – We will” (Robot Army). Towards the end of the period of 
study, one last noteworthy milestone was that on April 29, Margret Atwood mentioned SHD in 
an interview with The Globe and Mail – she (along with Ellen Page) became one of the celebrity 
reTweeters who had helped to expose SHD’s work to a larger community.  
The third batch of videos continued with this get-out-the-vote theme. They each played 
off of the second URL they had created and the joke from the “Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear” 
video. RubbishHarperDid would redirect to ShitHarperDid.com and it became the title for the 
four videos aimed at swing ridings. Each video promoted SHD organizers that were coming to 
the Edmonton, Kitchener-Waterloo, Saanich-Gulf Islands and Vancouver South to get-out-the-
vote. They received 1,628, 1662, 1574, and 3,854 views respectively, not nearly as many views 
as the other videos. This may have been because SHD posted on the videos May 1, 2011, one day 
before Election Day, or because they targeted specific audiences so others may not have been as 
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Table 3.5: Third batch of YouTube videos posted by ShitHarperDid 
































RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to EDMONTON! (iIWblq4ZOLI)	   01-May-11	   1,628	   5	   3	   17	   1	  
RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to KITCHNER-WATERLOO! 
(Ua9TSmfYQJU)	   01-May-11	   1,662	   2	   0	   16	   1	  
RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to SAANICH-GULF ISLANDS! 
(zW3PJuiB8yQ)	   01-May-11	   1,574	   5	   2	   16	   0	  
RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to VANCOUVER SOUTH! 
(d2BTGgO_sZM)	   01-May-11	   3,854	   10	   15	   19	   2	  
 
Referring to Appendix One, there were a range of posts found over the course of this 
campaign that have not been illustrated above. However, this timeline only shows a fraction of 
the data that was shared, leaving any conclusions that can be drawn tentative. This research is 
unable to account for posts on individual Facebook walls leading to clicks on the website and 
video views, as well as Twitter tweets, reTweets, and favourites that might provide insight into 
just how many people were involved in sharing this campaign. That said, it is still interesting to 
note the number of community members that posted on SHD’s own Facebook wall towards the 
end of the campaign in Table 3.6. There was a high level of interactivity present on the Facebook 
wall with people sharing relevant news stories and encouraging people to vote.  
Table 3.6: Posts by others on Shit Harper Did’s Facebook page15 
Number of Posts on Facebook	   Date	  
202	   30-Apr-11	  
228	   29-Apr-11	  
102	   28-Apr-11	  
After the election, and when this campaign of research ends, on May 3, 2011, SHD 
commented on the outcome, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Facebook’s “posted by others” feature on SHD’s timeline would only load for these three days. This echoes the 
frustrations mentioned in the Chapter Two regarding the difficulty of researching online. 
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Welcome to 4 years of a FALSE MAJORITY. Our archaic electoral system somehow just 
awarded 40% of voters 54% of the seats in Parliament, while awarding 60% of voters 46% 
of Parliament. We update our computer software almost daily, yet the system that allows us 
to choose our government hasn’t been updated in more than a century. 
SHD did not get the results they had hoped for, which I discuss in the conclusion of this chapter. 
The remaining posts on the Facebook wall spoke to the theme of the results of the popular vote. 
They also promoted a link to a LeadNow petition to hold the Prime Minister accountable. In the 
days following the election, SHD’s activity subsides. 
Part IV Media Analysis: “Scatological attack on Stephen Harper’s record goes 
viral” 
If the campaign had attracted media coverage, what was the press talking about? Effective 
media management by the PMO had effectively silenced the Canadian press as explained in 
Chapter One. Could SHD get journalists talking about the Harper record again? In a roundabout 
way, SHD exposed Harper’s record through their news coverage. The crash of 
www.ShitHarperDid.com and the popularity of the campaign did make the news, but coverage 
rarely unpacked the issues featured on the website.  
SHD received mostly negative or neutral coverage. As shown in Appendix Three in 
general articles that covered the website were neutral in their tone towards SHD. Two articles did 
take a negative tone. One article calls the group frivolous and the other is an opinion piece that 
took general offence to multiple satirical and profane sites. Three articles did cast SHD in a 
positive light. Two of these three framed SHD as a prescription for youth political apathy, and a 
letter to the editor promoted the site in a small local paper.  
Interestingly, only three of the articles acknowledge any of the issues featured on the 
SHD website. Instead, media coverage focused on youth political engagement taking place 
online. They framed SHD in two ways, finding them noteworthy for their “virality,” and the fact 
that the site had actually crashed (“Heavy traffic crashes anti-Harper Website” and “Vancouver-
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based anti-Harper website sh*tharperdid.ca attracts two million hits”). Or, articles only listed 
SHD in conjunction with other youth movements at the time such as voting mobs and other 
websites (“Viral Voting Videos: youth try to combat dismal turnout record among peers,” 
“ShitHarperDid.com uses humour to fight voter apathy,” “Pitching politics in with comedy; 
Humour grabs youths’ attention” and “Youth-led internet campaigns step up before Canadian 
poll”). Coverage also tended to focus on the phenomenon of social media usage in the election 
more generally.  
Nearly all the articles explicitly point out both that the site was humorous and that the 
name of the site was profane. One might speculate that this framed the site as a less serious 
critique of Harper’s work but, these two focuses reiterate the importance of political satire. For 
example, the article printed April 13, 2011 in The Globe and Mail, “Scatological attack on 
Stephen Harper’s record goes Viral: Aimed at engaging youth voters, videos featuring scruffy 
hipsters talking trash about Tory Leader tear up Twitter and Facebook,” features a lot of what the 
other articles covered: trashing Harper, social media, ‘virality,’ and youth voters. The article 
claims the video’s producer, Sean Devlin, “felt compelled to engage prospective voters with 
entertaining content,” and follows with a quote from him directly:  
I think Mr. Harper is reshaping this country in quite appalling ways, and I think people 
haven’t really taken notice because Canadian politics is kind of boring and I think Mr. 
Harper is actually using that as a strategy... When he is attacked or when really serious 
issues are brought up, he tried to make them seem boring, almost because he wants people 
to not pay attention. (Devlin in Houpt, 2011) 
Devlin claims they tried to repackage the white noise that the media prints in an entertaining way 
(Houpt, 2011). Yet, the article doesn’t go further by outlining the issues alluded to by Devlin. 
The coverage is a major point of disconnection in the SHD campaign as their perspective 
did not carry over into press coverage. As outlined earlier, the importance of breaking into this 
sphere is not just about reaching a wider audience, it is about the power that the media hold in 
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terms of agenda setting. The news is not simply an information source, it is able to persuade and 
inform in a particular way (Grossberg et al, 1998). The media determine what the politics for the 
day, and if SHD broke into that sphere by being worthy of news coverage, they became the word 
of the day. Ultimately, the press chose not to cover SHD’s critiques of Harper even though SHD 
did offer a new way to discuss Harper’s policies.  
Part V Discussion: Why SHD Matters 
SHD represents a shift in Canada’s traditional news cycle to a ‘political information 
cycle.’ It demonstrates why online campaigning works and the personal motivations that go into 
this kind of work by every single individual involved. SHD also demonstrates the affordances 
offered by the internet that have allowed for this kind of political advocacy to happen in the first 
place. Finally, this campaign is representative of new forms of media tactics and content 
hijacking.  
A ‘political information cycle’ 
As Chadwick (2012) argues, and is shown in the Literature Review, “increasingly, publics 
are able to exert influence and hold politicians and media to account through the use of newer 
media logics” (p. 59). This quotation sums up, almost perfectly, how SHD broke into the 
‘political information cycle.’ As the number of supporters grew, and more their campaign 
material was shared, the more SHD influenced the media. In a sense, the popularity of this 
campaign called for reaction from politicians. They did not only ask Prime Minister Harper to 
account for his actions, they reminded other politicians about issues that were important to 
SHD’s group of supporters and peers. SHD held the media to account for all the issues they left 
out of their election coverage and passed over during Harper’s leadership. 
One of the tactics SHD used to enter the ‘political information cycle’ was that as activists 
they engaged in activities that fit “seamlessly into their everyday routines” of their audience 
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(Papacharissi, 2011, p. 160). By posting in networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube – 
places where youth already participated in actively –SHD’s made content easy for supporters to 
share. The style of both the videos and the site were just as Devlin wanted, something “super-
sharable” and fun. The vast number of Facebook “likes” and YouTube views noted above prove 
that this was the case. Papacharissi (2011) suggests this kind of online activism allows for a more 
fluid kind of activism and civic engagement that gives citizens the ability to choose when, where, 
and how much they participate. There was no burden for supporters to participate in the 
campaign. By seamlessly integrating into their peer’s networks, the SHD website received 
enough hits to crash the website’s servers, post one of the most viewed video’s during the 
election, and get a substantial amount of press coverage.  
This changing media environment and SHD’s ability to access it is not demonstrative of a 
complete overhaul of the media system, rather, as Chadwick argues, this occurs within, “older 
media’s power and older media logics” (Chadwick 2012, p. 59). As Chadwick puts it, media 
organizations “are in many respects successfully co-opting newer media logics for their own 
purposes while at the same time restating and renewing logics that sustained their domain” (2012, 
p. 208). Mainstream media, even in a hybridized news cycle sustains and legitimizes power, 
recognized in this research because of the emphasis put on SHD entering mainstream news. By 
taking into account the framing of SHD in traditional media we can see the limited influence 
SHD had in bringing certain issues, such Harper’s cuts to many women’s programs, to the table. 
The dominant media did not pick up on all the issues SHD found important to the 2011 election. 
As argued before, any mention of the SHD campaign at all may still have, in a roundabout way, 
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Meaningful, connective action 
Rather than sitting back and doing nothing, the SHD organizers did something to 
counteract the way the federal Conservative party represented and communicated to them. 
Benkler argues that the internet allows one to become active members in public discourse and 
changes the way s/he observes and processes events (Benkler, 2006, p. 213). SHD’s observations 
were not just conversations within their offline community, these feelings were potential subjects 
for broader communication (Benkler, 2006, p. 213). Moreover, online content does not just go 
‘viral.’ There are individual people behind every share, like, retweet, and share. People shared the 
campaign and implicitly contributed to the relevance of SHD. Benkler (2006) argues, that people 
intrinsically care about the content they share online. The shared content is “something directly 
relevant to their lives and needs that they want to fix” (Benkler, 2006, p. 259). Through the 
sharing of SHD’s website and videos, young Canadians proved that they actually cared about the 
2011 federal election, and that the issues promoted by SHD were pertinent to them as voters. This 
case represents that online political advocacy is much more than just passive ‘clicktavism,’ 
sharing the SHD website and videos became a method of dissent and political action. 
This case also shows the validity of organizations that exist and act almost exclusively 
online. As Chadwick (2012) states, “The internet, [is] not just… a channel for the communication 
of information, but also a mechanism of organization and networked collective action in the 
creation of the news” (p. 46-47). These networks and organizations are also quite meaningful. 
The internet allows for “connective” action in which trusted relationships can be built online 
through the act of sharing ideas and acting together online (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 752-
53). This connectivity means that formal organizations no longer have to be the guide that leads 
political dissent or political action, people are able to take action and contribute in different ways 
online. At the same time, those involved in online organizing can express their personal beliefs 
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and feel a sense of validation for having contributed (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 752-53). 
SHD did not organize with their community to its full extent during the 2011 election as there 
were few opportunities for those outside of the core-group of organizers to contribute beyond 
sharing content. However, as shown in Chapter Four, opportunities to participate in new ways 
became intrinsic to their strategy in 2013.  
Internet affordances 
As mentioned earlier, SHD’s team consisted of 5-6 core members who relied on their 
friends to help with production, dissemination, and creation, and they only spent $250 on the 
campaign. This low budget and small team highlight the kinds of affordances offered by social 
media and the internet that have generally lowered the barriers of access for groups to mobilize or 
as Karpf (2012) puts it “organizing with different organizations” (p. 3). The following two 
examples illustrate some of the ways in which the SHD demonstrates the potential for online 
political advocacy work in Canada. 
When the site went live and quickly spread through SHD’s own network, it gained more 
and more traction the more it was shared. As previously mentioned, the Reddit community, 
strangers to the team, offered to back up the site. There is even one case of someone in Europe 
who let SHD know that the site had a back-up copy on a European server if it were to happen 
again (Dales, 2014). Dales also recalls that some of Devlin’s loosely connected acquaintances 
also began to help the group in a major way by volunteering to make sure that the content would 
be running at full capacity. This example demonstrates the tools that online organizing affords 
these kinds of groups. They can work with people who they have never even met, in different 
time zones, rather than within a more structured organization with paid staff. This decentralized 
structure, as argued by Karpf (2012), is key to online organizations, and he argues this 
decentralization will begin to play an intermediary role in defining civic beliefs and citizenship 
	  	   	  71	  
ideals (p. 11). As the next chapter explores how SHD begins to communicate more with their 
community, I show how SHD moved into that intermediary role.  
The following, second example also demonstrates how online political advocacy needs to 
be taken more seriously in Canada. The low cost of production and high viewership led to many 
skeptical inquiries from Elections Canada about third party political group spending limits. Dales 
(2014) remembers that this was very surprising for them:  
Elections Canada called us a million times, because they were convinced…that we were 
lying about how much money we had spent… In Canada you have to register as an official 
third party advertiser if you spend more than $500.00 on a campaign. So they were ringing 
our phone off the hook for like two weeks and we just ignored them. We were like ‘We 
don’t know what to do. This is serious.’  
When Dales finally worked up the courage to answer the phone, Elections Canada’s only 
question was about how much money they had spent. When he said they only spent $250 
Elections Canada left them alone. Dales recalls that an Member of Parliament publically mocked 
them for this in the media saying that SHD had “alleged to have spent $250.00” (Dales, 2014). 
Many found it hard to believe that this kind of action was inexpensive. Today, SHD’s website 
boasts that “Elections Canada officially recommended that federal election rules be changed to 
account for the big impact that our little campaign had” (Why you matter, n.d.). The Report of the 
Chief Electoral Officer under Section 3.3 Communications and Social Media reads,  
The third party regime reflects a concern for creating a level playing field between 
opponents with differing financial resources... Social media and the Internet are conducive 
to political participation by allowing a broad dissemination of messages at a very low cost. 
The use of new technologies can improve the federal electoral process by enhancing both 
equality and freedom of expression. To reduce the current uncertainty and take advantage 
of new technologies, Parliament may wish to consider excluding from the definition of 
election advertising all Internet-based communications by third parties, except perhaps 
communications placed for a fee by the originator on another site. (Mayrand, 2011) 
 Though there is no proof from Elections Canada that SHD is the cause of the above 
concern or the changes to the spending limit on non-registered third party groups to $250.00. 
	  	   	  72	  
Elections Canada does recommend in an official pubic record that online groups should be taken 
seriously for their potential for political upheaval.  
Tactical media 
SHD engaged in media tactics. As outlined in the Chapter One, tactical media is defined 
as the “media of crisis, criticisms and opposition” (Garcia & Lovink, 2001, p. 90). Particularly, 
with this campaign, SHD took full advantage of internet affordances, using free online space to 
run a popular campaign (Garcia & Lovink, 2001, p. 91). This campaign can also be read in terms 
of Raley’s definition of tactical media which focuses on the aspects of education, intervention, 
and disruption (Raley, 2009, p. 1). SHD worked to educate viewers not only about Harper’s 
political record but also about how as youth they could make a substantial difference in the 
outcome of the election. They linked their site to “Better Options” for whom to vote and targeted 
specific ridings where change could be made. The site also intervened in the media narrative 
about the election. The media coverage of their campaign served to bring youth perspectives into 
the mix. They also intervened in the representation of Harper’s policies. By curating a group of 
news stories not usually read together, SHD informed users, sparking critical thinking and 
political engagement. Finally, they also disrupted, clogged, or jammed social media feeds with 
their content. The quotation in which Dales recounts the story of how exciting it was to have 
filled all the staff at Radar DDB’s Facebook feeds is representative of how SHD became the most 
important thing on the web, at least that first day, for their peers.  
Cheap, online tools make these kinds of do-it-yourself media tactics possible. SHD used 
the shifting media environment to their advantage, using online tools, proven to work in the 
United States, and well-written, satirical content. They became one of the most interesting, 
online, political commentary during the 2011 federal election. SHD is noteworthy because it 
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represents a milestone in Canadian online political advocacy being one of the first groups to 
really mobilize in this way.  
Part VI Conclusion: Harper Wins 166 of 308 Seats  
Ultimately, Harper won the election. For all work SHD did to inform Canadians about 
Harper’s atrocious record, and even with all the people that viewed pleas for young people to 
vote for change, Harper’s power was only made clearer. Dales (2014) remembers watching the 
election on May 2, 2011,  
We didn’t see a translation between the amount of attention that it [the campaign] received 
and people going to the polls… we didn’t really see any swing. As we were watching the 
election and as we were watching seat after seat being grabbed we were just like ‘ugh.’ It 
was really a depressing, a really defeating moment. 
The SHD organizers had to recalibrate and come to a consensus about what had happened 
and where this project could go. They also had to figure out how to measure this as a success or a 
failure. Dales (2014) recalls,  
In the meetings afterwards a lot of what we were meeting about was the idea of this failure 
and what we could do with this failure or do we need to consider this project as a failure? 
Do we consider the measure of success that we did achieve? Can we use that to create some 
more currency? Or is this worth is it worth essentially trying to revive this thing? …Our 
real measure of success in that context is that there were people outside, or sort of on the 
outskirts of that particular group that put the first iteration of it together who wouldn’t touch 
talking politics with a ten foot pole and all of a sudden now it’s okay to talk about it 
because it’s kind of funny... so it’s more of a conversation that wasn’t existing before. It’s a 
not taboo subject where it was once taboo.  
Clark & Van Slyke argue that the success of such online phenomena may not actually be 
how they alter political discourse at all, but rather their ability to bring in new audiences, gain 
credibility, strive to influence, and show a demonstrated engagement with their community 
(Clark and Van Slyke, 2010, p. 55-56). The quotation from Dales above this represents this new 
audience, all these people “who wouldn’t touch talking politics” who engaged in SHD’s work. As 
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the next chapter will show, the very fact that SHD regrouped demonstrates their credibility and 
ongoing engagement in their work and community. 
Ultimately, SHD concluded that their campaign had been a success: 
The result of the attention that was given to that especially considering how many people 
we were able to add to our mailing list, to our Facebook community, all that kind of stuff, 
we realized like okay, we are not alone in dealing with this. This feeling of malaise or this 
feeling of not being communicated with effectively is totally something that is not isolated 
to say this part of Canada…It was a great success in the fact that the collective 
consciousness, what ever you want to call it, touched a nerve of some sort. (Dales, 2014)  
The organizers of SHD were not alone, and they were able to fill the interim time between the 
2011 federal election and the launch of ShitHarperDid 2.0. They even led a cross-country 
workshop series on university campuses in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, 
Edmonton, Vancouver, and Victoria. The SHD organizers workshopped “creative activism, 
history and strategies [and] met a lot of people over the course of that tour in during the course of 
that tour who have stepped up and really volunteered in various areas” (Dales, 2014). This 
support and their interim work kept the social media community active. 
SHD, even without defeating Harper, successfully demonstrated the ability to inform 
citizens about issues they cared about, and that others cared about enough to share. One might 
measure the success of their content, inspired by “What the fuck has Obama done so far,” by their 
own copycat, the “ShitHarperSaid” YouTube channel. ShitHarperSaid got just over 7,000 views 
but in the video description of their 12 videos posted between April 15-26, 2011, they encourage 
people to support ShitHarperDid.com: 
To learn more shit Harper did and said, visit www.ShitHarperDid.com. We are not 
affiliated to ShitHarperDid but we’re big fans and supporters. We join our voice to the 
ShitHarperDid movement and encourage you to do the same. Please go vote on May 2nd! 
(shitharpersaid, 2011) 
With that, perhaps the measure of success is that SHD started a ‘movement.’ The realization that 
they were not alone was powerful. Even with the sense of urgency that came with a short 
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election, SHD revived this community in a post-election context. SHD decided this campaign 
was not a “single serving thing” (Dales, 2014). This ability to continue to work with a group of 
support based online is at the very crux of this research, and I discuss SHD’s new strategies they 
picked up along the way in the next chapter. This chapter outlined how online political advocacy 
happens, what ‘virality’ as defined by the media coverage consists of, and how the internet 
worked in 2011. Of note, in the coming chapter, is that the internet looks like something else in 
2013. SHD has much more potential for action with a large online community of support. 
Though a small group can make headway through well-made content, relevant to their audience, 
with a better strategy, they can do that much and more. 
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Chapter Four: “Shit Harper Did Thinks You Matter” Becoming a 
Movement 
On April Fools’ Day 2013, Shit Harper Did (SHD) relaunched their website on the 
organizing system, NationBuilder. The website, www.shd.ca, claims:  
A lot of big movements have started as “just an internet thing”: Google, Twitter, the French 
Revolution (we assume). We have equipped the SHD community with an evolving set of 
innovative tools to turn online sharing into real world action. Our experienced Action Team 
is dedicated to working with you to develop creative and effective direct action in your 
community and across the country. (Why You Matter, n.d.)  
This promise encapsulates the change in SHD from a focus on tactical media and social sharing 
to a new kind of online, political organization. The “evolving set of innovative tools” describes 
the strategic deployment of the leading online organizing tool, NationBuilder, to support an 
issue-based, crowdfunding model of campaigning. SHD’s move into a space of offline, “real 
world action,” speaks to their 2013 campaign to air a television commercial advocating against 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan (CEAP) on CBC’s Hockey Night in Canada. Finally, SHD’s 
commitments to both its their community and to help mobilize “your community” speak to 
SHD’s new role connecting with and listening to supporters. This new perspective, strategy, and 
dedicated “Action Team” demonstrate the new forms that online political advocacy groups, such 
as SHD, are taking.  
This chapter explores two events as part of the evolution of SHD: the launch of its new, 
NationBuilder website that enabled it to set in motion, the second event their first campaign since 
the 2011 election. SHD’s goal for the anti-CEAP television spot was to tell a story about ‘bought’ 
versus ‘earned’ media and prove to the SHD community that together they were capable of 
voicing their opinion in the same space that the government was preaching to Canadians. SHD’s 
campaigns two years after the election, and today, shows that they embraced their community, 
listened to feedback, and engaged with members. SHD trusts their members to help with 
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campaigns, with helping to create content, and relies on members’ donations to fund the work. To 
do this, SHD moved to an issue-based campaigning model. This model runs timely campaigns to 
raise funds by creating a sense of urgency around controversies already in the media (Karpf, 
2012, p. 41). This style of campaigning is representative of a new kind of organization that exists 
online and is able to create campaigns offline.  
This chapter demonstrates how SHD represents of a new wave of online campaigning that 
is more organized than the media tactics campaign in 2011. I defend this claim by focusing on the 
software that led to this campaign’s success and by analyzing the spread of the anti-CEAP 
campaign. Part I begins with the launch of SHD’s NationBuilder website, and describes how they 
came to find this solution and its layout. Part II outlines SHD’s anti-CEAP television campaign. I 
explore the motivation behind the campaign, the broader political context in which it took place 
and the three aspects of the campaign: the IndieGoGo page and YouTube videos. Next, in Part 
III, the traffic tag timeline analysis highlights the networks that shared this campaign and shows 
that I found significantly fewer tags than in the 2011 SHD election campaign (see Chapter Three 
and Appendix One). I will also outline the amount of money SHD raised and the details behind 
the advertisement. The timeline reveals a proportionally higher amount of media stories. A 
content analysis of these stories in Part IV shows that SHD clearly communicates their criticisms 
about CEAP to the press. In Part V, I further highlight the major shifts that SHD has undergone 
in this new stage of organizing including: becoming a responsive community; the shift to run 
timely, specific and targeted campaigns; and moving some of their advocacy work offline.  
Part I The New Website: Shit Harper Did 2.0 
After realizing the potential SHD had to organize with the huge mailing list and social 
media following collected during the 2011 election, the organizers knew they had to find a tool 
that would allow them to use this data strategically. Like the original website, Devlin wanted Shit 
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Harper Did 2.0, to give users the same tailored experience with “fast, hit me again information” 
(Dales, 2014). The front end would include more topics, pages and categories than the original 
site and the back end would allow the staff to “drill into [the] metrics and see how things were 
performing” (Dales, 2014). Devlin wanted the website to be built with integrated software that 
would help SHD replicate the UpWorthy campaign model. This model uses native A/B testing to 
create the best possible content for their audience. For example, content shared on Facebook first 
goes through a test that compares two different versions of the content (using a different head 
line, link or image) on a smaller group of community members. The version with the most hits 
automatically is sent out to the rest of the community. Dales says that UpWorthy has “some 
sneaky code that no one ever got to look at” that would determine winning content. This kind of 
testing can also be run on mass email campaigns: changing the headline; placement of content, or 
sent-from address to see which performs best. This strategy of A/B testing is also used by 
organizations such as MoveOn.org (Karpf, 2012). This represents another example of a ‘module’ 
(Anderson, 1991) or ‘repertoire’ (Chadwick, 2007) migrating between organizations (see Chapter 
Three).  
After playing around with some other software solutions, including ActionKit, SHD 
found they could afford NationBuilder. It is one complete system that brings together many 
features including a database, email, text messaging, and social media tools (What is 
NationBuilder, n.d.). NationBuilder markets four key features that work together: organizing 
supporter data and activity; financing (including donations, goal setting, and personal fundraising 
with follow up prompts and searches); communications tools (such as email and text blasting and 
phoning integrated with social media data); and a website platform (which allows for multiple 
user pages and online accessibility) (NationBuilder Features, n.d.). It helps “businesses, 
nonprofits, governments, and politicians… to organize their communities and build more 
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meaningful relationships with customers, supporters, and constituents (What is NationBuilder, 
n.d). At an affordable cost per month – between $200-$1,000 depending on the number of 
emailable members – SHD would be able to run UpWorthy-style campaigns without having to 
“to mess around with super web savvy people on your backend” (Pay as you Grow, n.d. and 
Dales, 2014.) 
Toronto-based NationBuilder architects, cStreet Communications, helped SHD staff 
migrate their email list from 2011 from MailChimp onto NationBuilder, and taught SHD staff 
both how to do A/B testing on social media and email, and how to use NationBuilder’s 
fundraising tools. By bringing together their email, fundraising, and social media data into a 
central repository, or ‘nation’ SHD could then refine their messages to best target their 
community (Stuart, 2013). For example, NationBuilder’s tools can help SHD decide what kind of 
advertisement to put on TV by emailing members, creating a forum, or surveying members to 
find out which topic matters the most (Stuart, 2013). The software then allows SHD to raise 
money from their members to buy the airtime (Stuart, 2013). SHD can split their support list into 
groups based on members’ past interactions on social media, or based on donations so it can 
contact specific groups of people rather than blanket emailing all its supporters. This allows SHD 
to encourage supporters to become even more involved in the campaign. Stuart explains, 
instead of asking all those people to give to the next ad buy you ask all those people to give 
monthly, and then you ask all the non-donors to give to the ad buy… you convert them to 
sustained supporters. (Stuart, 2013) 
This toolset changed the way SHD runs campaigns, targets and interacts with community 
members, and can analyze their success. 
The new design 
The new site, ShitHarperDid 2.0, looks a lot different than the original site on Tumblr. 
The welcome page (Image 4.1) prominently features a member’s sign-up box and a pop-up (not-
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pictured) that floats onto the page as visitors click through various links on the site, urging them 
to sign-up for more information. The original Harper sketch sits in the headline with a speech 
bubble that scrolls through SHD members’ Tweets, Facebook likes/shares, or public donations. 
This scrolling feed is a NationBuilder feature that helps to highlight active community members 
and encourage others to do the same.  
Image 4.1: Home page of www.shd.ca (June 21, 2014) 
Scrolling further down the main page (Image 4.2), the “Shit Harper Did” style of informing 
visitors about the Prime Minister’s policies is retained. Currently, it features five images that, 
when clicked, reveal windows regarding different issues such as: Members of Parliaments’ 
controversial spending habits, cuts to Canada’s national childcare program, halted environmental 
impact assessments, and the robocalls scandal. For example, this window (Image 4.3), features 
sourced background information, including links to media coverage of the issue, and social 
sharing tools for Facebook, email and Twitter.  
 
	  	   	  81	  
 
Image 4.2: Images representing “Shit Harper Did”  
	  
Image 4.3: “Stephen Harper is a good economist, in theory” 
 
The site has been under constant construction since its April 2013 launch. SHD builds 
new pages for each new campaign. Permanent pages include: “Why You Matter” compelling 
visitors to join the community; a donation page; a page to “Submit a Fact” about the Harper 
government; a press information page; a volunteer sign-up form; a request form to bring SHD 
organizers to your community; and SHD’s privacy policy, contact information and details about 
contributions and refunds (www.shd.ca). One last page, “Our People” lists SHD’s “Action 
Team.” No longer just a group of friends disgruntled with the Conservative government, there are 
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now three staff members to organizing SHD campaigns. Each of these pages reveals SHD’s 
broader scope of campaigns and their increasingly more professional approach to its work. 
Part II Campaign Two: “Bought vs. Earned Media” and SHD’s Response to 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan 
The same day that SHD launched their new website, their first course of action was the 
release of two YouTube videos that were satirical “Director’s Cut” versions of official CEAP 
advertisements. SHD released two more videos on April 3, 2013. Each video featured a patched-
in a voice-over in top of the original government commercial. They critique both the ads and the 
program as a whole. The videos articulate, in a humorous way, much of the criticism CEAP had 
already received. Though SHD did not put these videos on television, the feedback from the 
community inspired them to run their first crowdfunded, issue-based campaign. This section will 
provide the context in which SHD ran this campaign and what the various components of the 
campaign. 
SHD targeted the contentious CEAP advertising campaign. The CEAP campaign was 
present in the media both in news coverage and via advertisements put out by the federal 
government through a variety of media. CEAP was the Federal Government’s highly branded 
response to the 2008 global recession. In the plan’s 2012 Final Report, Minister of Finance, Jim 
Flaherty, claims it had created 610,000 net new jobs and completed 30,000 projects since July of 
2009 (Flaherty, 2012). He asserts that the government’s prudent management of the program 
stimulated economic growth through multiple means such as: reducing taxes, helping 
unemployed Canadians, infrastructure projects (including improving education facilities, job 
creation, industry and community support and improving access to and strengthening the 
Canadian financial system) (Flaherty, 2012).  
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The plan did not receive the positive reception that the Conservative government hoped 
for (Beeby, 2013). CEAP went through its fair share of media scrutiny. In an article from the 
February 17, 2013, issue of The Toronto Star, Beeby reports,  
The Finance Department alone has spent well over $25 million in Economic Action Plan 
ads since 2009, in addition to tens of millions of EAP ad spending by other departments. 
The government reported $52.3 million in total EAP ad spending in 2009-10. 
Comparatively, Ottawa spent $41.3 million in 2005-06 on government advertising. Since Harper 
became prime minister spending has “roughly doubled” every year (The Canadian Press, 2013). 
Moreover, in 2013 a cross-country survey found that CEAP ads sent the wrong message entirely. 
Respondents called the ads “material ‘propaganda’ and a ‘waste of money,’ while fewer people 
than ever are taking any action after viewing the ads” (Beeby, 2013). Maclean’s magazine called 
the plan “an all-purpose brand for feel-good government measures” (c. The Canadian Press, 
2013). The government promoted tax credits predating the 2008 economic crash and a variety of 
First Nations announcements under CEAP even though they were not related to its strategy at all 
(c. The Canadian Press, 2013).  
SHD agreed with these criticisms and wanted to further inform Canadians about the 
realities behind the controversial plan. They felt that the 
Economic Action Plan ads were non-representative. They are prescriptive and they are 
misleading and they have been proven so and we wanted to put something on mainstream 
media in the same arena that challenges the content put forward by this set of propaganda 
which, if we are calling it what it is, is what it is. (Dales, 2014) 
The “Director’s Cut” videos were picking up traction, as confirmed by Dales, who said SHD 
received substantial feedback and support for them, and as also confirmed by the number of 
YouTube views each video received (16,093, 9,711, 10,183, and 14,401 respectively).  
Motivation: “bought vs. earned media” 
SHD decided to release a television advertisement based on positive feedback from their 
community about the YouTube series (Dales, 2014). If SHD was going to use this as an 
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opportunity to put the videos on television, they would “really need the help of the community” 
(Dales, 2014). Rather than airing one of the four “Director’s Cut’s” videos, SHD set out to make 
an ad that featured two specific criticisms of CEAP: that despite programs initiated under CEAP, 
the number of people accessing Food Banks was rising, and so, too, was the average household 
debt. On April 24, 2011, SHD posted an IndieGoGo campaign in order to fund the campaign 
through crowdfunding.16 People who directly supported the SHD message would pay for the 
campaign, unlike the advertisements for CEAP. The funds SHD raised would buy airtime on 
Hockey Night in Canada, pay for administrative and production costs, and a percentage would 
donated to the Canadian Food Bank. 
The government broadcast CEAP ads on some of the most expensive air-time available 
on Canadian television, during Hockey Night in Canada, and in particular, during the play-offs 
(Dales, 2014). This ties into the Conservative government’s strategy to appeal directly to 
Canadian citizens, such as live-Tweeting speeches, rather than relying on the media to report 
their work (See Chapter One, Part I). According to Dales (2014), SHD needed to run the 
campaign in the same space that the real CEAP ads ran, to prove to themselves, their members, 
and Canadian taxpayers, that they were capable directly responding to the government. SHD 
wanted to tell the story, as Dales (2014) put it, of bought vs. earned media. He explains,  
What’s this [campaign] going to do for us? Just say for example we are able to raise the 
money? We don’t know how but let’s say we can. We get this thing on TV. What’s it really 
going to do? We are only really going to be able afford to put this on TV one time. So it 
wasn’t necessarily about putting this thing on mainstream media. Getting it on mainstream 
media was the achievement but the story was about that piece of media was what we were 
after. It was the story of that piece of earned media vs. bought media. (Dales, 2014) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Even though NationBuilder has an integrated fundraising feature this first campaign was run on IndieGoGo. 
Speculatively, this might be because staff were still migrating data onto the platform or had not fully learned how to 
use the tools. Future campaigns to raise funds for similar projects were done on the website using a similar style as 
IndieGoGo.  
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SHD wanted to show Canadians what it means to earn support for a message on television. “The 
story was [about] a community of Canadians pitching in, to put an ad [on television] that 
challenges the hypocrisy of this administration and of this administrations approach to the 
economy” (Dales, 2014). Moreover, SHD wanted to highlight what they saw as the mainstream 
media’s complacently or lack of reporting on the controversial plan (Dales, 2014). Dales (2014) 
argues,  
If we were able to get this community to get this ad on the most watched television event 
yearly, the Stanley Cup Finals, then that says there is this dissent, this challenging voice, 
this questioning voice, exists in Canada and it exists outside of our mainstream media. 
What does that say about our mainstream media? What does that say about the willingness 
of our mainstream media to be controlled in some ways? And what does that say about how 
cavalier the federal Conservatives are being with the way they treat a national broadcasting 
source? 
SHD put a lot of weight on this campaign. More than just pointing out all the problems 
they had with CEAP, it also became a rare occasion for a political advocacy organization to show 
a different perspective on the issue. Putting this kind of advertisement on air is extremely rare. 
Adbusters had tried to put a similar style of campaign on Canadian television in 2009 and Global 
denied their request entirely, and the CBC ignored the desired airtimes (Adbusters Media, 2009). 
Adbusters took both media entities to court, where they won their appeal, clearing a path for SHD 
to do this kind of media work. Adbusters claimed that this case proves that it is the “right of 
Canadian citizens to have (as stipulated by the Canadian Broadcasting Act) ‘reasonable 
opportunity… to be exposed to the expression of differing views on matters of public concern’” 
(Adbusters, 2009). Similarly, in 2013, when Conservatives cut funding to the CBC, the 
organization FRIENDS of the CBC saw this as a further demonstration of Harper’s media control 
limiting the ability for the CBC to respond to the Prime Minister’s approach to the press. The 
CBC denied the FRIENDS’ request to air a commercial criticizing the funding cut (FRIENDS, 
2013). After SHD’s successful fundraising effort and getting airtime on CBC, SHD provided a 
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differing view and pushed back against the Conservative government’s CEAP well into the future 
(see Conclusion). 
The campaign: “Help ShitHarperDid.ca kick the Harper Government Right in the TV” 
The IndieGoGo campaign aimed to raise $6,000 by May 17, 2013 from community 
members. SHD’s actual goal was a hefty $95,000 (see Appendix Five), though it may have been 
lowered because IndieGoGo charges a 9% fee for unsuccessful campaigns as opposed to 4% fee 
for successful campaigns (IndieGoGo Basics, n.d.). The fundraising ask (Appendix Five) 
included infographics, an embedded promotional video, and goal meter. Not pictured, at the 
bottom of the IndieGoGo ask, is a reminder of SHD’s 2011 work, the tagline, also used on their 
new website. It reads:  
During the 2011 election, we started out as a few artists. With your help we became an 
unprecedented national community of people speaking truth to power. Together we reached 
millions of people. (sara, 2013) 
SHD bolsters the importance of their electoral work claiming, “as a result Elections Canada 
officially recommended that federal election rules be changed to account for the big impact that 
our little campaign had” (sara, 2013). The page also includes quotes from the media about their 
success in 2011, and their 2013 website launch. Each function as a way to legitimize the project 
showing SHD is capable of running a successful campaign.  
The second component of this campaign includes three promotional videos posted on 
YouTube. The videos made for the campaign are creative, funny pleas from SHD staff urging 
members to donate. They speak directly to community members rather than a broad audience of 
peers as they had done in the 2011 election. Table 4.1 outlines the popularity of the videos 
released by SHD.  
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You can help get this ShitHarperDid video on national 
TV! 24-Apr-13 55,667 127 81 259 64 
SHD community raises $27,000+ in one week to buy last 
relevant ad on TV 01-May-13 3,699 6 6 32 4 
We have until May 17th to share this video with as many 
people as possible. 14-May-13 38,916 108 320 302 
10
8 
ShitHarperDid Economic Action Plan TV Ad 24-May-13 39,219 66 93 181 14 
ShitHarperDid Economic Action Plan TV Ad 24-May-13 3,144 6 26 50 0 
 
The videos from this campaign received nearly all of their views within the first day of being 
posted. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show “You can help get this ShitHarperDid video on national TV!” 
video’s daily and cumulative views rates. 
Figure 4.1: “You can help get this ShitHarperDid video on national TV!” Daily Views  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Views, Comments, Thumbs Up and Thumbs Down are relevant as of April 9, 2014. Shares are relevant as of June 
9, 2014. 
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Figure 4.2: “You can help get this ShitHarperDid video on national TV!” Cumulative Views  
 
SHD embedded their first video in the IndieGoGo ask which 55,667 views. It features 
Brigette DePape, pleading to community members to do something to challenge CEAP. She 
states that community members had asked that their work be put on the air and SHD had listened. 
DePape asks members to help raise $95,000 to air a commercial during the NHL playoffs, which 
was a tangible goal if every member of the SHD community donated $2. The video ends with the 
advertisement they had made.  
The second video posted again speaks to the community members directly, thanking them 
by name, for supporting the campaign. The final video points to the urgency of raising funds 
before the IndieGoGo deadline. It also shows how SHD found ways to engage its supporters 
beyond donations. An important feature of this video is that SHD used images sent in by 
community members voluntarily posing next to CEAP billboards in their neighbourhoods, 
holding large red arrows representing local statistics of growing number of people requiring 
access to food banks in their region (Image 4.4). 
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Image 4.4: New Brunswick SHD supporters photo-bombing CEAP sign 
 
Part III Social Media and SHD’s Anti-CEAP Campaign: Finding New Ways 
to Gain Support 
During this campaign, SHD used social media to facilitate aspects of the campaign, like 
the photo-bombing, but also relied on the various platforms to share the campaign. There was 
much more structure in this approach. The campaign received both support and criticism in 
various networks. I found fewer tags found between April 24, 2013, the date the SHD posted the 
IndieGoGo campaign, and June 1, 2013, marking the last day mainstream media coverage. There 
are, however, proportionally more tags found in mainstream media coverage. Table 4.2 shows 
how many results each tag had, and demonstrates that the majority of the content found was in 
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16 “Shit Harper Did” 
9 “ShitHarperDid” 
9 Brigette DePape 
4 Shit Harper Did  
4 Sean Devlin 
3 Sh*t Harper Did 






0 YouTube URLs 
In Figure 4.3, a visualization of Appendix Four, there is not as strong a correlation 
between SHD posts on social media (Facebook and YouTube) and reaction in various online 
communities and the mainstream media as there is in Appendix One during the 2011 federal 
election. Though social media posts by SHD did receive a lot of attention from their community 
(as shown further on) SHD also communicated directly to their mailing list. The success of this 
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Figure 4.3: SHD content sharing by platform and time 
 
As illustrated in Appendix Four blogs and forums had a slower reaction to this campaign. 
The data in Appendix Four shows that the first blog to even mention the campaign was posted 
two days after the launch of the IndieGoGo campaign. A second blog post was not posted until 
April 28, 2013. One major highlight occurred on April 30, 2013, when The Tyee featured the 
campaign prominently on their site. The Tyee has a large readership and by posting SHD’s 
campaign they further promoted the cause to a group of like-minded Canadians. Over the course 
of the month of May, ten more blog posts encouraged readers to support SHD’s campaign.  
As opposed to the last campaign, where viewers could only watch and share the videos 
made by SHD, this time, SHD encouraged community members to participate by donating 
money or by making content for some of the YouTube videos. On May 7, 2013. SHD started 
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asking community members on Facebook to photo-bomb CEAP signs in their region and send in 
the pictures. These images visually represented the two political points SHD made in their TV 
spot. The images showed that across the country, SHD supporters saw the effects of the recession 
and evidence of growing financial disparity. Over the next few days, SHD made requests on 
Facebook asking supporters, in various cities, to help with the campaign. For example, one post 
reads  
This Saturday SHD community members across the country will be photo-bombing 
Conservative Economic Action Plan ads! If you want your photo-bomb to be featured in 
next week’s SHD video please RSVP to this Thursday’s special conference call by clicking 
here: http://ow.ly/kO2gq [Link to “Call for ShitHarperDid Video Action” Conference call 
on Maestro Conference]. (Appendix Six) 
I can only speculate that these images were used in the second YouTube video “We have until 
May 17th to share this video with as many people…” posted on May 14, 2013 (see Image 4.4 
above). The above post also highlights the how SHD set up a conference call with those who 
would be involved to work closely with community members on the project. This clearly shows 
how SHD made a concerted effort to engage with their community members at large. 
Post on Facebook remained a key way for SHD to communicate to their audience. 
Appendix Four reveals how popular SHD’s Facebook posts were over the course of their anti-
CEAP campaign. SHD continued to share content that was not necessarily about CEAP with their 
members. For example, one of the most popular posts on Facebook from May 8, 2013, was about 
broader controversies regarding federal government spending. Over the course of the two years 
between these campaigns, SHD kept communicating to their supporters on Facebook which has 
been growing in importance as a platform for online communication. SHD’s page became known 
for bringing together news stories and activist responses to controversial issues that arose under 
Harper’s leadership. Another popular post on Facebook included a link to the video, “We have 
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until May 17th to share this video with as many people as possible,” which was shared 2,094 
times (Appendix Six). This demonstrates how engaged, despite the few tags and low view counts, 
community members were in the campaign. 
Over the course of this campaign, supporters also posted on SHD’s Facebook wall. The 
majority of these linked to various news stories and comments about SHD’s anti-CEAP 
campaign or SHD’s work in general. Posts rarely received more than a couple comments, likes or 
shares. Table 4.5 shows how many posts people made on their Facebook profile page. The 
number of posts per day is a fraction of the posts during the 2011 Federal Campaign (see Table 
3.6) yet, there was still interaction occurring within this space. 
Table 4.5: Posts by others on Shit Harper Did’s Facebook page 






























As Dales points out, SHD had thought that their new NationBuilder site might become the 
main platform for community members to interact with SHD staff and each other. They realized 
that,  
Facebook worked so well for keeping people in contact and it was already working pretty 
seamlessly and we had this huge community. It was kind of folly for us to think that 
[supporters would say] “Yeah, I am going to sign up for another social network, especially 
one that doesn’t use the same feature set as Facebook.” (Dales, 2014) 
Facebook remained the space in which SHD’s audience could be found, and acted as the space in 
which this audience could interact with SHD staff. 
Appendix Four also reveals how the Reddit community responded to this campaign in a 
more nuanced way than during the 2011 federal election. In the past, Reddit was a place of 
support and a community that helped SHD immensely when the site crashed (Dales, 2014). 
Support for the campaign in 2013 was not nearly as fervent – for each positive post and UpVote 
there was nearly as much disapproval. There were multiple right-wing, conservative responses to 
SHD from one subReddit, metaCanada. The members had an adverse reaction to SHD’s 2013 
website launched and to this campaign, more generally. One post from May 15, 2013 post, “How 
anti-Conservative lies perpetuate themselves,” reads, 
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Enough young “intelligent” people will read SHD.ca in the lead-up to the next election and 
will believe this bullshit. It simply doesn’t matter that it was based in nothing. There is just 
enough to spread the idea around and to keep it alive. (Lone Conservative, 2013) 
The post received 25 UpVotes, and 14 DownVotes. On May 17, 2013 in the same subReddit, a 
user named trollunit posted sarcastically, “Our favourite Senate page is trying to get 
ShitHarperDid on national TV,” and the link to the first campaign video. The post received 15 
UpVotes, and 5 DownVotes. SHD had become more controversial or perhaps popular enough to 
have enemies. 
The positive posts on Reddit included six posts on May 14, 2013 that each promoted the 
campaign. Even though the posts were positive, the two that gained the most traction also 
received a lot of dissent. One of these posts, “ShitHarperDid.ca is trying to get a commercial on 
TV during an NHL playoff game. Here is their pitch to you” received 16 UpVotes and 16 
DownVotes (Appendix Four). Another post shared SHD’s urgent call at the end of their 
campaign, 
If they raise $95,000 they’ll buy a spot during an NHL playoff game, sending their message 
to one million people from coast to coast. #shitharperdid 4 days left. @indiegogo. 
(Appendix Four) 
It received 45 UpVotes, 36 DownVotes, just barely a positive response. Two more people posted 
positive comments on May 15, 2013 and May 17, 2013, neither of which are particularly popular 
(Appendix Four). SHD did not need the Reddit network to pick up their campaign – rather they 
needed to appeal to their supporters directly through their own established channels.  
All this online activity did translate into dollars. The community responded, and by May 
17, 2013, SHD exceeded their low target raising $76,412 (Dales, 2014 and ‘Help Kick Harper,’ 
n.d.). This included 594 public donations of $10, 68 donations of $100, and 5 donations of $500. 
A quick run of the numbers reveals that this only adds up to $15,240, with a total of 2,305 
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donors. The remaining 1,638 donors raised $61,172 through private donations (from groups such 
as Mennonites for a Better Canada, Killing Time Entertainment and Canucks for Change) all for 
unreleased amounts and donations that were at different amounts than the set giving rates ($10, 
$100, $500, and $1000). Rather than putting out a general appeal to community members, this 
kind of issue-based fundraising is modelled on the way MoveOn raises funds. It links fundraising 
asks to “whatever issue dominates the current media cycle” (Karpf, 2012, p. 41). In this case 
SHD created a sense of urgency by trying to air the ads during the NHL playoffs in the same 
context that the government was airing their advertisements. 
The TV ad: “Brought to you by the taxpayers who paid for those ******* 
conservative ads” 
The television advertisement also constituted the last two video’s SHD posted on YouTube 
during this campaign, both on YouTube May 24, 2013. Each was viewed 39,219 and 3,114 times 
respectively, and had the following description:  
ShitHarperDid’s people-powered ad will begin airing during hockey games the weekend of 
May 24th. The first ad airs Friday May 24th during CBC’s Hockey Night in Canada in the 
first period of the Senators vs. Penguins game (starts 7:30PM PST). Through our 
IndieGoGo campaign, the ShitHarperDid community has raised over $76,000, of which 
$11,000 will go to Food Banks Canada. Thank you to everyone who made this possible! 
Follow us at www.shd.ca or www.facebook.com/shitharperdiddotcom for more info as the 
ads air (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umlsgkG9vAo). (c. ShitHarperDid, 2013) 
The ad takes place in a living room filled with nondescript Canadian sports fans that express 
exaggerated displeasure, in slow motion, when a CEAP advertisement comes on the television 
they are watching (Image 4.6). SHD juxtaposes CEAP claims with counter-claims that both the 
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Image 4.6: SHD TV spot with non descript sports fans 
 
Image 4.7: Food bank use in Canada 
 
Other than the rather humorous look and antics of the characters the tone of the television spot is 
quite serious. At the end of the thirty-second advertisement a disclaimer is displayed and read out 
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Image 4.8: SHD TV spot disclaimer 
  
Dales recalls, that a volunteer crew made the advertisement in 48 hours. He explains that 
there was an unknown learning curve that comes with producing content for televisions. For 
example, to his memory, the ad aired between a Ford and a Wendy’s commercial which really 
highlighted the low quality of their own video. Dales (2014) explains, 
For example, our audio on the master was turned way down so people couldn’t hear what 
the hell was going on during the commercial. So that stuff was difficult when you put it on 
next to something that had a million a half budget for a thirty second spot. 
The SHD organizers were still amateurs in the field even with the new tool kit of strategies they 
had picked up during the two years preceding this campaign.  
Part IV Media Analysis: “Anti-Harper comedians seek ‘meaningful’ change”18 
As with the 2011 campaign, breaking into a ‘political information cycle’ for this 
campaign was equally advantageous. During the 2011 federal election, SHD broke into this cycle 
because of the instant popularity of their videos and site. In this campaign, SHD not only put 
their campaign on television, directly against the government ads, they also gained news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 (Kane, 2013)  
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coverage that put them in direct conversations with controversial aspects of CEAP. This coverage 
often brought up SHD’s own critiques of CEAP. Generally, as Appendix Seven shows, news 
articles mention the government’s over-sized budget for CEAP marketing and cite SHD as 
actively criticizing the program on television. Half of the articles actually cite SHD’s two main 
claim that prove the Conservative government is touting a program that has not worked – the 
growing use of Food Banks across the country and the rising average household debt. These two 
issues became part of the wider frame about CEAP (Appendix Seven, column “Issues Covered,” 
“Household Debt,” and “Food Banks”). SHD brought new issues into the news coverage of 
CEAP. Similar to the theme during the 2011 coverage, the articles highlight the unique, newness 
of this kind of crowdfunding in Canada. Brigette DePape is featured prominently in the SHD 
campaign videos and is tagged in the media as a ‘rogue page,’ linking her back to her previous 
activism. Even though SHD is featured in a fewer number of articles than it was for its 2011 
campaign, this coverage demonstrates that they have again successfully entered the ‘political 
information cycle’ as non-elites (see Chapter Three, Part V).  
Three examples of the media coverage found in Appendix Seven demonstrate the nuances 
of the coverage this campaign received. The first article published May 7, 2013, in The Globe 
and Mail, titled, 
Trudeau and anti-Conservative groups see fundraising boost: The federal Conservatives 
have, for many years, been the masters of party financing, but they’re starting to get 
challengers. (Galloway) 
Different from other articles in above table, this article focuses on political party fundraising, 
noting the ability for the federal Conservative’s to fundraise with great ease. Galloway notes, 
On a more micro-scale, non-partisan but decidedly anti-Harper groups are finding it’s 
becoming easier to raise money to fund their own attacks on the Conservative government. 
One of them is ShitHarperDid.com… (2013)  
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This article is unlike any other article found in the first campaign because it brings up SHD as the 
one key example of third party fundraising happening outside of the party system. According to 
Galloway, SHD is the most interesting or notable case of political advocacy at that moment. The 
article also clearly outlines SHD’s anti-CEAP stance.  
The most widespread article in Canada, by Bruce Cheadle, published May 19, 2013 in 
various Post Media venues, “Harper Government buying ads to promote job program that doesn’t 
yet exist” (see Appendix Seven). Cheadle (2013) reports that the federal government is “spending 
hundreds of thousands of dollars advertising a program that does not yet exist.” The article 
directly frames SHD’s work against CEAP. Though the tropes that played out in the last 
campaign, such as pointing our SHD’s “naughty name” are once again used the article does show 
how SHD demonstrates that CEAP is not, at the expense of Canadian tax payers, living up to its 
stated goals. Unfortunately, Cheadle does not name SHD’s two main criticisms regarding 
household debt and food bank use.  
Finally, on May 17, 2013, The Toronto Star published a story called “Comedy website 
raises $50,000 for anti-Stephen Harper ad” by Laura Kane. The tag line reads “A satirical website 
with an unprintable name related to Stephen Harper is turning humour into political activism with 
a new fundraising campaign” (Kane, 2013). The title alone plays on many of the tropes that 
occurred during the last campaign, noting the profanity and humour that are intrinsic to the 
identity of SHD. Even though in the body of the article Kane refers to SHD as pranksters she also 
quotes the two facts featured on their television ad. This article also focuses on the newness 
associated with crowdfunding campaigns in Canada.  
Part V Discussion: “We Heard Your Feedback Loud and Clear” 
SHD became an online organization that listens, in a meaningful way, to their community 
members, as well as one that trusts members to do work for them, and support the organization 
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financially. This case study shows that SHD is well on their way to mastering a style of issue-
based campaigning that both creates a sense of urgency and offers a specific solution to an 
identifiable problem. The few traffic tags found during this campaign demonstrate that SHD had 
more effective, more direct ways to communicate with their supporters using NationBuilder. 
Finally, since 2011, SHD has found a way to become a more responsive organization, listening to 
their community members and moving some aspects of their advocacy work offline. 
Becoming a community 
In the first video released during this campaign, DePape explains that  
We got fantastic feedback from community members like you. From Oak Bay, BC, to 
North Bay, Ontario. From Winnipeg to Montreal. We consistently heard one desire, ‘I wish 
SHD’s videos were on TV.’ We heard your feedback loud and clear. (a. ShitHarperDid, 
2013) 
Dales (2014) explains that in the past, SHD had been nervous about taking community members’ 
suggestions “to heart.” SHD had a very strict about the look of their content and did not let 
supporters participate in the process of creating content (Dales, 2014). Yet, people constantly 
contacted the organizers explaining how they loved SHD’s work and really wanted to participate 
more (Dales, 2014). SHD knew they had to foster this relationship better. Dales (2014) continues, 
“if you are going to act as a community that exists on social media, we should be willing to be 
social, there should be an interplay there. There should be a give and take.” So, when the 
suggestions to put the videos on television started coming in Devlin explains that this was the 
opportunity to interact that they were looking for. The campaign was inspired by, used images 
from, and was ultimately paid for by the community. The Facebook call for photo-bombing and 
the conference call to organize the project shows how seriously SHD took the call to engage with 
supporters. Community members wanted to be trusted to help with a campaign that they too 
cared about. The lesson they had learned from the success of this campaign, in regards to their 
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community, was that, “people are willing to get off their computer and do something in the real 
world” (Dales, 2014).  
This engagement with supporters is a key theme that carries through the three YouTube 
videos. SHD did not post the videos to build a following, as they did in 2011; rather, they spoke 
directly to their supporters through the videos. The videos took the opportunity to thank the 
community for their support, and encourage members to continue sharing the content. For 
example, in the second video, SHD comically scrolls through a list of community members, 
directly thanking them for their support, and praising them publicly. In the last video, a direct ask 
is made to SHD supporters – “share, share, urgent, share, share, share, share, right now, share, 
share, share, share, cher” the video to help SHD make the fundraising goal (b. ShitHarperDid, 
2013). SHD makes it clear that in order for the campaign to work, community members need to 
share the content. The last video also directly thanks one member, “Sarah Williams and her 
daughter who sent us this picture from Nunavut,” which became part of the photo-bombing 
project. This level of engagement works to encourage members to participate so they too, can be 
featured in future content. 
Issue-based campaigning 
One of the most important findings in the traffic tag research is that I found fewer tags. 
There were also significantly fewer views of SHD’s YouTube videos (see Table 4.1 compared to 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5). This decrease does not necessarily indicate that one campaign was more 
successful than the other but rather it represents the shift in strategy to issue-based campaigning.  
SHD created structured opportunities for participating in this campaign. They took 
feedback and suggestions on the content and theme for the campaign from their community. This 
kind of organizing is much more structured than the 2011 campaign, which relied on media 
tactics and social sharing. NationBuilder gave SHD organizational capacities to create a sense of 
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urgency around the 2013 campaign. This style of issue-based campaigning, fostered by the 
internet, allows for quick campaigns that “fundraise and organize public pressure around… short-
run controversies” (Karpf, 2012, p. 41). As mentioned earlier, this style is present in SHD’s 
fundraising strategy that appeals to donors by using campaigns that are already controversies 
present in the media (Karpf, 2012, p. 41). Running a campaign this way and using an A/B native 
testing technique, is a strategy borrowed from MoveOn.org, another organization that has moved 
away from a traditional model of political organizing. Karpf (2012) explains the difference: 
While direct-mail fundraising uses relatively generic issue appeals to solicit small general 
funding donations, MoveOn uses targeted e-mails fundraising to make timely appeals 
related to a specific fundraising purpose. (p. 42) 
SHD found a way to make generic dissent for CEAP into something specific, airing a commercial 
on CBC, and ultimately setting the deadline for the hockey playoffs. SHD could have carried 
their general anti-Harper sentiment over from the 2011 election however, to be financially viable 
and effective organizers came up with smaller campaigns, like this one, to keep SHD’s 
community involved, supportive, and interested.  
Moving offline 
With a new website built on NationBuilder’s organization software, SHD changed their 
focus from being just a group that promotes campaigns existing solely online. The shift to offline 
work and their growth as an online political advocacy organization represents a move between 
Karpf’s (2012) and Bimber et al.’s (2006 and 2012) organization categories. It is important to 
think about these categories in respect to SHD’s work because it helps to place them in 
conjunction with how similar organizations work. Using Karpf’s (2012) categorizations, SHD, 
back in 2011 SHD was an “Internet media issues generalist” (p. 78). Communication was top-
down from the organizers disseminated down to potential supporters. The first of Karpf’s (2012) 
other two categories “Online communities of interest” (p. 78) foster member-to-member 
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communication which SHD has not done yet, but Dales (2014) hopes that in the future SHD 
might create a separate platform on NationBuilder that would be a space for activists to meet and 
to network. The second category “neo-federated organizations” use online organization tools to 
arrange offline engagement (Karpf, 2012, p. 78). SHD’s television campaign in 2013 shifted the 
group into this category of organization. Though not all of their campaigns today include offline 
components they use NationBuilder’s online organization tools, such email marketing and 
crowdfunding, to create offline actions and engagements.  
This echoes back to Bimber et al. (2006 and 2012) who categorize online political 
organizations by their modes of interaction and modes of engagement. The mode of interaction 
for community members of SHD, especially during the 2011 federal election, is quite weak and 
impersonal. There is no focus on building or fostering relationship between supporters rather 
SHD priorities expressing their concerns which happened to match their community. This focus 
in 2013 gradually moved to be more interactive. They take suggestions from their members to 
make sure they have their support and are building stronger ties among members by highlighting 
their activity on the NationBuilder website. Bimber et al.’s (2006 and 2012) categorizes 
organizations by their mode of engagement or how much responsibility is given to each member. 
Here too SHD, in 2011, gave little to no responsibility to its members. In 2013, they have 
gradually have begun to give small responsibilities to members. This includes funding the 
organization, asking them to share content, participate in content making, and sharing 
responsibility for the success or failure of their campaigns.  
SHD embraces the social aspect of online organizing and moved some of their actions 
offline in a concerted effort to spur change in Canadian politics. They also attempt to move away 
from a top-level-down model of communication with in the huge network they have created. This 
progression from one category to another demonstrates how internally, online political advocacy 
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organizations seek to increase political participation. As noted in the traffic tag analysis, posts by 
others on the SHD Facebook wall received very little interaction from others. This might be 
chalked up to the way that “posts by others” are displayed on Facebook pages, but it also points 
out that SHD maintained a way for members to communicate with one another. 
Part VI Conclusion: Issue-Based Campaigning 
What I have demonstrated by outlining the new NationBuilder site together with an 
analysis of the success of the 2013 crowdfunding campaign is that the strategies that SHD has 
learned since 2011 have drastically changed the way they can campaign online. SHD sent a 
powerful message by placing an ad on the same platform used by the government. SHD informed 
citizens about an alternative view of how CEAP is performing. They have also fostered a new 
relationship with their community members. The traffic tag timeline reveals how differently the 
two campaigns functioned in online networks. The content of this campaign did not go ‘viral;’ 
instead, SHD made direct pleas to community members, involving them in the creation of 
content, and thanking them publically. SHD mobilized this campaign strategically. When the 
media reported on the campaign, there was a notable difference in the style and content of their 
framing compared to 2011. Rather then positioning SHD within a group of similar groups using 
social media, the media features SHD in a variety of ways, including being one of the only 
groups that offered a public voice against CEAP. Not only did SHD enter the ‘political 
information cycle,’ the issues that SHD thought were most important entered the public 
conversation about CEAP. The rising use of food banks in Canada and the rising household debt 
were clearly communicated to the wider public through the media. SHD’s ability to target 
community members and run a new style of campaigns is because of NationBuilder’s game-
changing, organizational software. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have shown how Shit Harper Did (SHD) represents ongoing change in the 
Canadian political advocacy environment. SHD first informed Canadians through a tactical use 
of funny online videos and then moved to a model of strategic, issue-based campaigning. By way 
of conclusion, I will first go back to the questions posed in my introduction. I will reflect on the 
inspiration behind SHD’s tactics and strategies and how they used the internet to inform and 
organize. Next, I will look at the relationship between the two campaigns and how SHD 
influenced the broader Canadian context. Then, I will argue that despite not having affected the 
Harper government in any tangible way, SHD’s ability to break into the ‘political information 
cycle’ is demonstrative of new ways Canadian political activists strive to make change. I will 
then reflect on some of the limitations of this research. Finally, I will highlight some of SHD’s 
ongoing work to show they still have an engaged community that strives to ‘wreak havoc’ on the 
Conservative government (Shaw, 2011). 
How do political activists use social media and the internet to organize and inform? What 
prompted SHD’s tactics and strategies?  
 
The tactics and strategies used by SHD came from the logics of social media platforms, 
other online advocacy campaigns and through their own attempt to represent public opinion. 
SHD found platforms that helped to spread their message and organize support. Facebook and 
NationBuilder were both used by SHD to inform and organize. They reached a large number of 
people with their criticisms and because of the first campaign’s ‘virality,’ SHD garnered media 
attention. In the second campaign, they went beyond social media to inform. Their new strategies 
raised enough money to inform Canadians offline via television. Their commercial informed a 
broad audience about SHD’s critiques of CEAP. The commercial also showed the SHD 
community that together they could pay to air mainstream television content that had earned 
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support, as opposed to the government’s promotion of a plan that lacked public support. SHD 
succeeded, in part, by representing public opinion. In 2011, Harper’s control of the press, 
outlined in the literature review, frustrated the media and the public, creating a sympathetic 
environment for a group of comedians to satirize Harper’s policies and image. In 2013, SHD’s 
satirical commercial reflected many Canadians’ views of CEAP advertisements. Where SHD’s 
2011 campaign had simply resonated, they used their NationBuilder platform to listen to 
supporters and launch the anti-CEAP campaign based on their feedback.  
SHD found inspiration in media advocacy from the United States such as, “What the fuck 
has Obama done so far?”, the UpWorthy-style of issue-based campaigning, as well as use of the 
NationBuilder platform. The transferring of some of these strategies from the United States to 
Canada can be mapped in very tangible ways. Devlin, for example, learned about UpWorthy 
strategy at a conference whose organizers also introduced him to NationBuilder (Dales, 2014). I 
have shown a direct flow of tactics from past political campaigns to SHD.  
How do the previous tactics of a small group of comedians compliment or compete with 
SHD’s current long-term strategies for political organizing and advocacy? How do these 
new strategies, such as the use of social media, been influenced by, or influence, the 
changing Canadian political and media environment? 
 
SHD’s former tactics compliment their long-term organizing strategies. Their claim to 
fame is their satirical approach and their strategies for bringing in the community they have 
today. Satire runs through all of their campaigns. SHD also uses the media coverage of their 2011 
campaign to promote newer campaigns as a way to legitimize their work. Through satire SHD 
invited a group of Canadians into the political world, and they turned out not to be as apathetic as 
the media portrayed. Proof of this comes from the success of the 2013 anti-CEAP campaign. 
Satirical content and the ensuing success of their election campaign are two ways SHD’s first 
campaign compliments their long-term strategies. Their early tactics built an audience that would 
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become their community. Though at the end of the 2011 campaign SHD was overcome by the 
majority Conservative government and recognized that even though they did not change the 
outcome of the election, they built a huge network of supporters. These community members laid 
the foundation for the successful relaunch of SHD 2.0 and their subsequent campaigns. 
Supporters wanted to help SHD in more ways than just participating on social media. The 
mailing list and Facebook supporters from the 2011campaign clearly helped SHD move forward 
as an organization.  
SHD’s use of social media and online campaigns has influenced the political environment 
in Canada. SHD is ahead of the game in comparison to how Canadian politicians approach social 
media, and it is able to catalyze much more successful campaigns. During the 2011 election 
political parties were on Twitter and used Facebook, however they did not really embrace the 
platforms’ full capabilities (Francoli et al., 2011). Today, political parties move to amp up their 
technology use, run better databases, and find new ways to target supporters. However, especially 
in 2011, political advocacy groups were better at mobilizing people online (Francoli et al., 2011). 
In 2013, and going forward, online political organizations such as LeadNow and OpenMedia are 
on the rise in Canada. These groups, and SHD, have better strategies to target and organize in 
comparison to political parties that use older, proprietary systems. SHD’s ongoing success shows 
that online organizing has become a part of Canadian politics.  
SHD has also been influenced by the changing media environment in Canada. As more 
and more news content moves online SHD uses this to their advantage. Facebook has become a 
platform to find and read the news and SHD’s Facebook page has become a place to share news 
about and campaigns against the Harper government. This keeps up momentum between 
campaigns, reminding the community what they, together, are working towards. SHD has also 
become better at clearly outlining what their criticisms are, which is another way they seek to 
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influence political discourse in the media. In the 2013 campaign, SHD chose two specific 
critiques of CEAP and mentioned them in every aspect of the campaign. The media ultimately 
brought both issues up in their coverage of the campaign.  
Has SHD’s work in exposing the political practices of Stephen Harper influenced the media 
coverage of the Conservative government or resulted in political change? Has sharing 
information become a catalyst for political action?  
 
Using the research gathered for this thesis I am unable to conclude whether the overall 
media coverage of the Conservative government between 2011 and 2013 has changed or measure 
broad political change in Canada. Though this may be unanswerable now, it may not be the case 
following the 2015 federal election or with further research. Perhaps the work of SHD and other 
progressive political advocacy groups in Canada will lead to measurable change in both electoral 
politics and media coverage. This question encourages future work and points to the importance 
of groups such as SHD to the Canadian political environment. Whether or not SHD changed the 
narrative of Stephen Harper and his party, they brought together a community of like-minded 
individuals. Cliché as it may be, many are more powerful than one. We will have to wait to see if 
the information publicized by SHD will result in tangible, measurable outcomes in the coming 
election. 
That said, between 2011 and 2013 SHD did receive media attention for both campaigns, 
the latter of which outlined their criticisms of the government more clearly. Harper is still in 
power and the issues that sparked SHD into being have not been solved. CEAP is still present in 
multiple government-funded media campaigns and programs. Even with widespread support, and 
the ability to raise funds quickly, it is unlikely that SHD is on the Prime Minister’s radar. That 
being said, it is important that SHD was able to run a campaign at all in 2013, and that it still 
exists today, because this indicates they are speaking to and for a large group of Canadians. They 
raised enough money to openly criticize the government on television, more than once. Though 
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they may not be a household name across the country, for many young Canadians they are a 
much needed critical voice against Conservative policies.  
This ability to continue to run campaigns happens because of the SHD community. Dales 
knew that if SHD was going to turn their social media support into a thriving organization they 
would need to be a real community and not just say they were (Dales, 2014). They embraced 
their members’ calls to help and found ways to integrate members into their work. In their 2013 
videos, SHD spoke to community members directly. This in a sense is one way in which sharing 
information has led to on-the-ground political action. SHD also moved their content offline onto 
television and organized workshops to continue to build their network of supporters. Dales 
(2014) explains that as they dream of “developing a non-violent direct action network across the 
country… that most likely is going to leverage NationBuilder’s social aspects in a much bigger 
and much more comprehensive way.” As it stands now, they are using the “website agnostic of a 
toolset and it’s going to be way more of a place to organize” (Stuart, 2014). Each campaign SHD 
runs and their approach to social media is about informing Canadians and reminding them that 
there are others who have the same political beliefs. SHD has successfully taken this approach 
and moved their work offline, creating campaigns that are building political action against the 
Conservative government.  
Limitations 
There are two limitations that I encountered in this research. The first is the limitation of 
the research methodology and the second is the limitation of using the case study to make claims 
about the broader political environment in Canada. In terms of the methodology, the data I have 
collected is limited by the platforms. I chose not to collect tags from Twitter because the sheer 
number of Tweets was too much to scrape on my own and I was not able to access SHD’s 
Twitter archive. Manually recording these posts would have been next to impossible. Further, 
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making conclusions from the YouTube video view count is difficult because there is no way to 
account for bots, people watching the video more than once, or people viewing the video who do 
not support SHD. The traffic tag analysis is limited by Google’s algorithms and Facebook’s ever-
changing timeline archive. Having access to only one lead organizer behind SHD, for one hour 
interview, also limited the amount of insider knowledge I could get. However, without it, I would 
have never been able to make any claims regarding the data collected. Finally, during the 2013 
campaign, I had not signed up for the SHD newsletter and was unable to reach staff to forward 
archives of that material. Such information would have further strengthened the claims made in 
Chapter Four. 
Using the SHD case study to make broad claims about online political advocacy 
organizations in Canada comes with some apprehension. This is not a comparative study that 
accounts for other organizations gaining popularity in Canada today, such as LeadNow or 
OpenMedia. However, case-studies about these online movements in Canada are few and far 
between. As I have demonstrated in the literature review, in the United States online organization 
is growing in importance and Canadian organizations and political parties are learning from this. 
This case study seeks to explain one way in which these tactics and strategies are happening in a 
Canadian context. 
Shit Harper Did today 
After the anti-CEAP advertisement was aired, SHD continued to run campaigns, some of 
which continued to target CEAP. Their first campaign following the anti-CEAP advertisement 
was submitting a job application for the federal government’s $113,000,000 advertising contract 
to create the next round of CEAP advertisements in 2013 (Tell Harper, n.d.).19 SHD then raised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 SHD sent in a completed application, including an “uncommonly smooth stone” to help the reader remain calm, 
and re-wrote the entire application process to turn a 52-page form into three questions: “Do you want to make these 
ads?”; “Are you pure of heart?”; “Will you waste tax payer’s money?” The recommended budget for the project 
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$18,417 to buy local air time during the 2013 Conservative Convention in Calgary, Alberta to air 
another, advertisement criticizing unnecessary Conservative MP spending (Help 
ShitHarperDid.com, n.d). For that campaign, they used their own NationBuilder fundraising 
platform. The website SHD also urges supporters to take direct, non-violent action against 
Harper’s environmental policies (We ruined Harper’s pipeline, n.d.) after two SHD organizers, 
dressed as waiters, found their way on stage during Harper’s 2014 address at the Vancouver 
Board of Trade and held up signs reading “Climate Justice Now” (Mas, 2014). Most recently, in 
the spring of 2014, SHD has released four more satirical CEAP commercials that call out specific 
ways the program has not worked (The Conservative Economic, n.d.). They even managed to air 
one national advertisement during a World Cup playoff game on CBC in July 2014. This 
campaign was promoted on the domain, www.economicactionplan.ca, which was conveniently 
available, and used the same NationBuilder platform as their main website. Presumably, any data 
collected on the joke website would be filtered into their own data set. The SHD community 
continues to support, both financially and through various actions as needed, all the above 
campaigns and the staff. 
SHD continues to develop and improve its campaign strategy. Dales dreams about SHD 
forming a network of activists across the country. SHD also wonders if they might better use the 
data analytics in NationBuilder. By moving onto NationBuilder SHD is able to track supporters’ 
engagement with their content which has been invaluable. Dales explains that with NationBuilder 
SHD organizers are 
able to drill down and really identify the potential real-world, tight connections, between 
people and… see [connections] between people and the organization. We can see those at 
the start of their life-cycle so that’s really cool (Dales, 2014).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
allocated the majority of the funds to reinstating funding to programmes that had been cut by the Conservative 
government such as to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Elections Canada and the Canadian Broadcasting 
Company (Tell Harper, n.d.). 
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Their ability to use this data will allow SHD to target their supporters in different ways in each 
subsequent campaign. SHD will be able to encourage supporters to move from donating one 
time, to perhaps donating on a regular basis. As SHD learns along the way, they find that “people 
are willing to get off their computer and do something in the real world” (Dales, 2014). Knowing 
that people are willing to get out there, SHD can use NationBuilder’s toolset to help encourage 
them.  
Final remarks 
SHD makes two major claims on their website today. The first is that “during the 2011 
federal election we started out as a few artists. With your help we became an unprecedented 
national community of people speaking truth to power.” (Why you matter, n.d.). The second, the 
new website’s tagline, is, “Know it. All.” These claims represent the SHD case study perfectly. 
Starting as a group of comedians the organizers were surprised to find that a huge community of 
Canadians agreed with their concerns about Stephen Harper. Together, SHD and its supporters 
could make change or, at the very least, make the news. The website’s tagline, “Know it. All,” 
reminds visitors it is not just the media who should hold the government responsible for their 
actions. Citizens, like those who visit the SHD website, have a responsibility to inform 
themselves. As SHD moves forward today, they have found a new strategy to organize their 
community to both inform and to speak truth to power. They still work towards their long term 
goals which, according to Devlin, are that they  
need people to plug into others in their community and start to organize… In the short term, 
the ultimate goal is to get Harper out of government. But the community we build will 
hopefully help usher in a new government... we hope [that community] will be prepared to 
get that government to account and push for the systemic changes we need to get through… 
(Bitonti, 2013) 
Even if Harper is no longer Prime Minister after 2015, SHD’s work will continue. 
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Appendices  
Appendix One: Traffic tag timeline of SHD’s 2011 federal election campaign 
See attachment. 
Appendix Two: SHD posts on their Facebook wall with total likes and comments 
Post content	   Date	  
Likes/ 
Comments	  
"You guys knocked out the site. We're getting so much traffic! We'll be up and running ASAP"	   13-Apr-11	   194 Likes 32 Comments	  
"Sorry, everyone. We just found out we've had ONE MILLION HITS since 8am. We'll be up and 
running again soon."	   13-Apr-11	   160 Likes 10 Comments	  
"It's coming back up! be patient!"	   13-Apr-11	   78 Likes 11 Comments	  
"Those scruffy hipsters"	   13-Apr-11	   302 Likes 34 Comments	  
"We have 5 minutes to hit 10,000 or @kevinward has pledged to vote conservative! Help!	   13-Apr-11	   138 Likes 26 Comments	  
10,000 - Thank you! More than 2 dozen young Canadians have volunteered their time to prepping 
this for the past 2 weeks. Thank you for embracing it so quickly! We have lots more in the works -- 
stay tuned and spread the word. PS. the word is "VOTE""	   13-Apr-11	   325 Likes 26 Comments	  
"Thanks for all the nice emails! Someone just warned us that: "s.350 (1) of the Elections Canada 
act states - A third party shall not incur election advertising expenses of a total amount of more than 
$150,000 during an election period." ---- We've spent less than $200 so far, rented some lights for 
our video shoot and paid for some webspace. Appreciate the concern though!"	   13-Apr-11	   479 Likes 51 Comments	  
"Anti-Harper social media attack goes viral" - Vancouver Sun	   14-Apr-11	   302 Likes 26 Share	  
"Last night we asked you if we could hit 10,000 by this morning... about to hit 20,000 - Thank you! 
Please "Suggest To Friends" Will have some fun stuff for you to play with later today "	   14-Apr-11	   318 Likes 37 Comments	  
"You are all incredibly inspiring. Thanks for the support."	   14-Apr-11	   591 Likes 58 Comments	  
"Just finished an all night re-design of shitharperdid.com with Justin Guptelll! new site is up"	   15-Apr-11	   179 Likes 41 Comments	  
"We passed 3.5 million hits in the first 36 hours! The national media is embracing our message, 
with some reporting that we've "changed the game"...and it's all because of YOU. We put this thing 
together, but it is your overwhelming support that gives it true strength. New videos on the way..."	   15-Apr-11	   836 Likes 95 Comments	  
"The majority of human body is water, the majority of Stephen Harper's body is cruel."	   15-Apr-11	   596 Likes 72 Comments 	  
"About to crack 30K! YouTube App just added - click the youtube button to the left under the 
drawing of Steve. More vids coming. 	   15-Apr-11	   146 Likes 13 Comments	  
"We really appreciate that many of you are telling us that it isn't just the "youth" that we're speaking 
to. Keep it coming. These issues transcend age"	   15-Apr-11	   475 Likes 94 Comments	  
""Vulgar, viral, informative and hilarious...may just change the game." - AdBusters --- If we can get 
AdBusters AND CanWest media on side... must be doing something right!" Link	   15-Apr-11	   403 Likes 25 Comments	  
"Sign it! This is some real dictatorship style ShitHarperDid.com" Link	   15-Apr-11	   278 Likes 48 Comments	  
"Stephen Harper is in the Vancouver area tomorrow - Burnaby a key swing riding. Maybe you'd like 
to join these folks and say hello to our Prime Minister?"	   15-Apr-11	   412 Likes 64 Comments 	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"NEW VIDEO! Not all that serious. But we will be releasing 1 a day this week! Others with a more 
serious focus. No matter where you are in Canada please join us for ShitHarperDid.com 
PRESENTS Vote Responsively, Dance Recklessly"	   18-Apr-11	   310 Likes 56 Comments	  
"We swear when we talk about Stephen Harper, because its an honest expression of how we feel. 
The thing which is truly offensive is his record as PM. We fully endorse this video produced by a 
young Canadian"	   19-Apr-11	   239 Likes 26 Comments	  
"Actual Patriotism has to do with loving a place enough to try and improve it" - Win Butler (Arcade 
Fire) LInk	   19-Apr-11	   503 Likes 15 Comments	  
"OUR NEW VIDEO! Let us not forget WHY this election was called!"	   19-Apr-11	   727 Likes 53 Comments 	  
"OUR NEW VIDEO! This one's for the ladies... well not strictly speaking (but we just wanted 
to say that, makes us feel like cool DJ or something)."	   20-Apr-11	   833 Likes 54 Comments	  
"Turns out he lied during the debate - who'd a thunk it?" Link	   21-Apr-11	   60 Likes 382 Comments	  
"Need help with some videos! Does anyone live in the follow ridings? Kitchener-Waterloo, 
Kitchener-Center, Edmonton-Strathcona, Vancouver South, Saanich Gulf Islands, Mississauga-
Ernidale, Saskatoon-Rosetown-Biggar, Brampton-West, Brampton-Springdale, Saint John NB -- If 
so please email us at shitharpervideo@gmail.com [Please include your riding in the subject line]"	   22-Apr-11	   38 Likes 37 Comments	  
"This is TOMORROW. Anyone else have unwelcoming parties planned? "	   23-Apr-11	   202 Likes 47 Comments	  
"NEW VIDEO! Advanced polls today & Monday! MORE INFO HERE 
http://www.elections.ca/scripts/vis/finded"	   23-Apr-11	   212 Likes 22 Comments	  
"Hi Folks! If you live in Vancouver and are interested in being an extra in a video we are producing 
for broadcast on TV - please email extrasforharper@gmail.com SHOOT is TOMORROW (Monday) 
8pm-11pm"	   24-Apr-11	   72 Likes 22 Comments	  
"Honoured to have start of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Opening Ceremonies, Slam Poetry 
Champion Shan Koyczan - ask us to share this with you." link	   26-Apr-11	   506 Likes 87 Comments	  
"Early voting was up 35% from the last election ++ Friday & Monday were the highest turnouts for 
early voting days EVER! Did you vote early? Or are you voting on Monday?"	   28-Apr-11	   219 Likes 91 Comments	  
"Harper Victory?" - Says who? Link	   28-Apr-11	   71 Likes 271 Comments	  
"<URGENT> We are getting reports out of Guelph (swing riding) that Republican-Style ILLEGAL 
vote suppression tactics are being used. People are getting called and told their polling station has 
changed. If you receive one of these calls KEEP THE # & ASK WHO THEY ARE! Pls SPREAD 
THE WORD - Don't let them trick you out of voting!"	   02-May-11	   453 Likes 107 Comments	  
"Welcome to 4 years of a FALSE MAJORITY. Our archaic electoral system somehow just awarded 
40% of voters 54% of the seats in Parliament, while awarding 60% of voters 46% of Parliament. We 
update our computer software almost daily, yet the system that allows us to choose our government 
hasn't been updated in more than a century."	   03-May-11	   1332 Likes 165 Comments	  
"If our electoral system were a professional "Guy who slices up pizza and hands it out at the 
birthday party" he would be out of a job and this birthday party would be full of screaming children. 
So at the risk of being labeled a screaming child, let me say this: In Canada we have some form of 
democracy, but it is not a modern one and certainly, it is not a fair one."	   04-May-11	   352 Likes 38 Comments	  






	  	   	  123	  




















N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, profanity anti-
Harper, GOTV, other 
sites/events	  
Scatological attack on Stephen 
Harper’s record goes viral; Aimed 
at engaging youth voters, videos 
featuring scruffy hipsters talking 
trash about Tory Leader tear up 
Twitter and Facebook	   Globe and Mail	   13-Apr-11	   Simon Houpt	  
N	   2 issues as description	   viral/crashed, youth vote, humour, profanity anti-Harper, other 
sites/events	   Viral voting videos: youth try to combat dismal turnout record among peers	   The Canadian Press	   14-Apr-11	   Allison Jones	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, youth vote, humour, anti-Harper, 
other sites/events	   Tories, Grits and Greens on the defensive	   Postmedia News	   14-Apr-11	   Althia Raj	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, 
humour, voter turnout	   Website shitharperdid.com uses humour to fight voter apathy	   The Province	   04/14/2011 and 04/15/2
011	   Jennifer Saltman	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, profanity, anti-
Harper, other 
sites/events	   Harper haters take message online	   Regina Leader Post	   15-Apr-11	   Robert Hiltz	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, profanity, 
ELECTIONS ACT	   Vancouver-based anti-Harper website sh*tharperdid.ca attracts two million hits	   Postmedia News/ Vancouver Sun	   15-Apr-11	   Gillian Shaw	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, anti-Harper, 
voter turnout, other 
sites/events	   Heavy traffic crashes anti-Harper website	   Victoria Times Colonist	   15-Apr-11	   VTC	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, anti-
Harper	   @P.A. politicians, where the # are you?	   Prince Albert Daily Herald/ Prince Albert Rural Roots. 	   04/16/2011 and 04/24/2011	   Hannah Zitner	  
P	   2 issues vaguely	   social media, youth vote, 	   Popular website seen as engine to get out youth vote	   The Vancouver Sun	   16-Apr-11	   John Sbragia	  
NG	   no	   social media, humour, GOTV, other sites/events	   Campaign fatigue meets fun, frivolity with online election games.	   Postmedia News	   19-Apr-11	   Misty Harris	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NG	   no	   anti-Harper, GOTV, other sites/events	   Do Canadians need to be sexually cajoled into voting? A website has pitted 64 candidates against each other to let the people determine 
who is 'Canada's Sexiest Election 
Candidate	   The Globe and Mail	   26-Apr-11	   Zosia Bielski	  
P	   brief reference 
to 'content'	   	   Tories show themselves as Criminal Party	   Summerland Review and Penticton Western 
News	   26-Apr-11	   Frank Martins, letter to the editor	  
P	   no	   Viral/Crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, profanity, other 
sites/events	   Stirring the pot…	   Omineca Express and Caledonia Courier (Fort St. James)	   27-Apr-11	   Ruth Lloyd	  
N	   no	   social media,	   Voters take over Canada's Twitter election	   itbusiness.ca	   27-Apr-11	   Nestor E. Arellano	  
P	   no	   humour, profanity, other sites/events	   Margaret Atwood at the editorial board	   The Globe and Mail	   29-Apr-11	   Globe and Mail	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, humour, profanity, anti-
Harper, other 
sites/events	   The Party	   Power Play with Don Martin	   29-Apr-11	   Don Martin	  
N	   no	   viral/crashed, social media, youth vote, anti-Harper, other 
sites/events	   Youth-led Internet campaigns step up before Canadian poll	   Agence France Presse/ ARP Journal Internet	   01-May-11	   Judi Rever	  
N	   no	   social media, humour, GOTV	   Social media's election impact not much to tweet about	   West Ender	   04-May-11	   Jessica Barrett	  
*N (Neutral), NG (Negative), P (Positive). 
Appendix Four: Traffic tag timeline of SHD’s Anti-CEAP campaign  
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Appendix Five: Help ShitHarperDid Kick the Harper Government Right in TV 
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Appendix Six: SHD posts on their Facebook wall with total likes, comments, and shares 




NEW report reveals the government misplaced $3.1 billion in “anti-terrorism” funding. The other $9.8 
billion they didn’t lose was used for things like infringing on our basic civil liberties, targeting people of 
colour as well as indigenous and environmental activists as “terrorists.” READ MORE: 







GOOD NEWS! First New Mexico, now Nova Scotia! We should all change the names of our homes to 
“N-something Something.”  




152 Likes  
8 Comments 
49 Shares 
This Saturday SHD community members across the country will be photo-bombing 
Conservative Economic Action Plan ads! If you want your photo-bomb to be featured in next 
week’s SHD video please RSVP to this Thursday’s special conference call by clicking here: 




37 Likes  
3 Comments 
2 Shares  
Live in Nova Scotia, PEI, MB, SK or Nunavut? We are looking for one person from your province to 
make our next project happen! Can you take a special photo this Saturday and be part of 







BREAKING NEWS: Today a Toronto Star investigation found that 90% of $2.4 billion paid for 
“management consulting” comes with no description of the work done. LIKE/SHARE if you think people 
deserve to know how their money is being spent. JOIN US: http://www.shd.ca/why_you_matter 







Live in Newfoundland? We are looking for one person from your province to make our next project 
happen! Can you take a special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’’s next video? 
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Excited to see all the photo-bombs on Saturday! Have you RSVP’’d yet? Looking forward to the 
conference call we’re about to do with more than 40 people who have stepped up to be SHD action 
leaders in every province and territory - Brigette. 







Hi PEI! We are looking for one person from PEI to make our next project happen! Can you take a 
special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’’s next video? If so, e-mail brigette@shd.ca 







POSTERS - Photo-Bomb the Harper Conservative Billboards  






39 Shares  
Hi Alberta! We are looking for one person from PEI to make our next project happen! Can you take a 
special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’s next video? If so, e-mail brigette@shd.ca 







One of the most popular stories on the Metro News site is about your people-powered TV ad campaign! 
We are very excited to see how many people the SHD community can reach before the crowdfunding 





3 Comments  
55 Shares  
Hi Prince Edward Island! We are looking for one person from PEI to make our next project happen! Can 
you take a special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’’s next video? If so, e-mail 







Hi Quebec! We are looking for one person from PEI to make our next project happen! Can you take a 
special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’’s next video? If so, e-mail brigette@shd.ca 







Check out our NEW VIDEO! Then head on over to Indiegogo to contribute: 
http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/help-shitharperdid-ca-kick-the-harper-government-right-in-the-







SHARE if you want to see our people-powered ad on TV during the playoffs! Watch the ad and donate 






311 Shares  
Tell us what additional TV spots you want to air the ad on by voting 
HERE: http://www.shd.ca/ad_buy_survey_2 The first airing is TONIGHT during the Ottawa vs. 
Pittsburgh hockey game, which starts at 7:30pm EST. The SHD ad will air during two playoff hockey 








Some historical context for the federal court’s ruling on robocalls. READ MORE: 








According to CBC overnight ratings, about 1.8 million people saw the SHD advertisement during last 
Friday’s hockey game! That’s roughly 3.6 million eyeballs drinking it in, all thanks to you! Get ready, 1.8 
million people, the ad is going to air during hockey AGAIN this weekend! Congratulations to the SHD 
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Topic Headline Paper Date Author 
N No 
new website, humour, Young people’s 
political apathy, Rogue Page, 2011, 
federal election Success,  
Merry band of Vancouver 
pranksters relaunch Sh*t 





13 Mike Hager 
N Yes 
IndieGoGo funds, CEAP Failure, new 
website, humour, Young people’s 
political apathy, Embridge Hearing. 
Sh*t Harper Did activists 
coming to a TV Screen 




13 Mike Hager 
N Yes 
Anti-Harper, IndieGoGo, Fundraising, 
CEAP Failure, third party spending 
limits, Liberal Party Fundraising, 
Political Party Advertising Budgets. 
Trudeau and anti-
Conservative groups see 
fundraising boost 
The Globe and Mail 07-May-13 
Gloria 
Galloway 





N Yes IndieGoGo Campaign, CEAP Failure, Household Debt, Food Banks. 
Sh*tHarperDid hopes for 
satiric TV ad MetroNews.ca 
10-May-
13 Luke Simcoe 
P Yes 
Young people’s voter apathy, Social 
Media, Rogue page, federal election 
Success, New Website, CEAP Failure. 
Can online Activism incite 
political agency? 
ShitHarperDid keeps 





Profanity, Satire, CEAP Failure, 
Household debt, Food Banks, 
IndieGoGo Campaign, Social Media, 
2011 federal election Success, Rogue 
Page. 
Comedy Website Raises 
$50,000 for anti-Stephen 
Harper ad 
The Toronto Star 17-May-13 Laura Kane 
N Yes 
CEAP, Provincial hold up on CEAP, 
CEAP Failure, anti-Harper, Profanity, 
IndieGoGo Campaign, Misleading ads, 
Conservative branding. 
Harper Government 
buying ads to promote 




Brandon Sun, The 


















Profanity, humour, Anti-Harper, CEAP 
Failure, Household Debt, Food Banks 
federal election Success, Brigette 
DePage Rogue Page, IndieGoGo 
campaign, Trainings. 
Anti-Harper comedians 
seek ‘meaningful’ change The Toronto Star 
19-May-
13 Laura Kane 
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N Yes 
2011 federal election Success, 
IndieGoGo Campaign, CEAP Failure, 
Household Debt, Food Banks. 
New ShitHarperDid ad to 
receive television début 
tonight during CBC’s 
Hockey Night in Canada 
The Staight.com 24-May-13 Yolande Cole 
 Yes 
Anti-Harper, Satire, IndieGoGo 
Campaign, CEAP doesn’t work, 
Household Debt, Food Banks. 
Anti-Stephen Harper 
group raises enough 
money to air attack ad on 
Hockey Night in Canada 
Yahoo 24-May-13 Andy Radia 
N Yes 
Viral, 2011 federal election Success, 
CEAP Failure, IndieGoGo campaign, 
Food Bank, Household Debt. 
Shit Harper Did Ad Airs 






*N (Neutral), NG (Negative), P (Positive).   
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Image 3.2: BarackObamaIsYourNewBicycle.com	  
 
Image from: http://web.archive.org/web/20081103004313/http://www.barackobamaisyournewbicycle.com/.  
SHD remade the American website in a way that would be culturally relevant for young 
Canadians. This transference of tactics is important to note as it is part of online, political culture. 
Political tactics and strategies circulate as modules across campaigns and borders (Tarrow, 1994). 
They are modular in the sense that they are “capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees 
of self-consciousness to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a 
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations” (Anderson, 1991, p. 4). 
This copying behaviour is encouraged online. Chadwick suggests that “parties, interest 
groups and social movement can and do borrow from each other’s typical organizational and 
mobilization repertoires” (2007, p. 284). Chadwick uses the term “repertoires” to refer to 
organizational forms or tactics adopted by similar organization (2007, p. 284). SHD’s campaign 
tactics, specifically their website layout and style, highlight the kinds of tactics, designs, and 
campaign tools that circulated as modules or repertoires in 2011. In the next chapter, I speak to 
!! !(+!
Image 3.3: “ShitHarperDid.com” Harper’s Mayonnaise 
 
Image from: http://www.canadiandesignresource.ca/digital/shitharperdid-com/. 
The site included links to “Watch our Videos” (linking to their YouTube channel), “Follow us on 
Twitter,” and had an embedded Facebook “Like” feature. There was also an option to sign up for 
a newsletter for notifications of future videos which presumably this list became imperative to 
their 2013 campaign. At the bottom of the page a set of links to the Liberal, NDP, Bloq 
Quebecois, and Green Parties’ respective sites. Though not affiliated with any other party, SHD 
encouraged visitors to educate themselves about what they called “BETTER options.” By 
clicking the “Seriously? Tell me some other shit” button, the layout of the site remained the same 
while the quotation, description, and linked news sources would cycle through 27 other 




Image 3.4: “ShitHarperDid.com” Egomaniacal Harper 
Image from: http://canadaartsconnect.com/magazine/2011/04/how-artists-are-using-social-media-to-influcence-the-
vote/.  
SHD’s website, like “What the fuck has Obama done so far?” would scroll through 
satirical quips about Harper’s record. Unlike the American counter-part, 
www.ShitHarperDid.com would highlight flaws in the national leader’s administration rather 
than successes. Some of the issues that the site would generate included: Harper’s denial of 
Canada’s colonial past (Murphy, 2011), weakening the regulations of the Canadian food 
inspection agency (Kempton, 2011), removing the portraits of past Prime Ministers in the 
hallways of the House of Commons and replacing them with his own (Coleman, 2011), 
rebranding the Government of Canada to “The Harper Government” (Mira Catherine, 2011), the 
G20 security budget and arrests data (Nolan, 2011), and the lack of action towards providing safe 
drinking water on Canadian reservations (Ross P, 2011). These jokes linked to news sites 
confirming their facts. Finally, the sketch of Harper with a kitten pokes fun of the “softer side” of 
!! !).!
 
Image 3.6: Screen Shot of Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com	  
 
The first batch of videos ended with a title screen promoting the website (Image 3.7). They used 
celebrity names, such as Celine Dion, Ryan Gosling, Ben Mulroney, and Pokémon in their titles,
but not the celebrities themselves, encouraging people to get to the polls, citing the low voter 
turnout that brought Stephen Harper to power in the previous election. The videos do not get into 
















Image 3.7: Screen Shot of the end title screen of the first batch of SHD videos 
!
The second batch of videos had the same aesthetic, with actors standing in front of a 
white screen with clips of them cut together delivering jokes as well as urging young people to 
both vote and visit the website or educate themselves about Stephen Harper’s political reputation. 
However, rather than ending with the image of Harper with a kitten the title screen features the 
website URL in bold white on a purple background. 
SHD geared the third batch of videos towards four specific cities (Edmonton, Kitchener-
Waterloo, Saanich-Gulf Islands and Vancouver South). They did not feature any live actors or 
video clips but instead included a compilation of still images illustrating a narration encouraging 
people to come out to their on-the-ground events in the riding. The images used included screen 
shots of the SHD website, local landmarks in each city, and silly pictures that went along with the 






Image 3.8: Screen shot of “Go away bees!” in “RubbishHarperDid.com Comes to 
SAANICH-GULF ISLANDS!”  
 
Image 3.9: Screen shot of swing riding NDP candidate in “RubbishHarperDid.com Comes 
to EDMONTON!”  
 
Each of videos in the third batch ended with a title screen featuring the URL 
RubbishHarperDid.com referring to the video “Stephen Harper’s Greatest Fear” from the second 
batch that urged voters to tell their grandparents about the SHD website (in a less profane way).  
!! !))!
Figure 3.1: SHD content sharing by platform and time 
 
 
On the first day of the launch April 11, 2011, a huge spike in traffic would ultimately lead 
to the website crashing. I located links to the shitharper.com and two YouTube videos on three 
blogs, two forums, and Tegan and Sara’s fans’ Tumblr page (Appendix One). By April 13, 2011, 
just over 24 hours later, SHD posted on their Facebook wall: “Sorry, everyone. We just found out 
we’ve had ONE MILLION HITS since 8am. We’ll be up and running again soon” (Appendix 
One). The Facebook comment received 160 likes – a small number compared to what would 
come. Later that same day SHD posted that the number of likes of the Facebook page had grown, 
10,000 - Thank you! More than 2-dozen young Canadians have volunteered their time to 
prepping this for the past 2 weeks. Thank you for embracing it so quickly! We have lots 
more in the works -- stay tuned and spread the word. PS. the word is VOTE.	 (Appendix 
One) 
The post acquired 325 likes. In one day SHD reached 10,000 people. That day there people 
posted seven times on Reddit (the most popular getting 45 “upvotes”), and linked to SHD content 
!! !)+!
The first batch of videos received 60,809, 225,582, 93,423, and 54,884 views each, 
respectively – higher than many of the Vote Mob videos or most videos shared by a political 
party. These numbers are not to be dismissed when compared with other “viral phenomena” on 
YouTube – Hiltz (2011) reports that “among its videos [Ryan Gosling Not Endorsing 
ShitHarperDid.com] was the one most shared by Canadians on YouTube Wednesday – the 
website’s fifth most-viewed video nationwide.” Referring back to Table 3.1, the videos received 
substantially more views than the university student vote mobs. Also, even the most popular “It’s 
Over Steve” video, mentioned earlier, only got 68,227 views. SHD was most definitely the most 
popular Canadian political group posting on YouTube at the time. As with all subsequent videos, 
the first batch of videos received the majority of views within the first days of being posted. An 
example of the instantaneous popularity of the one of the first video’s posted is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3.  




Figure 3.3: “Celine Dion Not Endorsing ShitHarperDid.com” Cumulative Views 
 
On April 14, 2011, SHD reported to their Facebook community that, 
Last night we asked you if we could hit 10,000 by this morning... about to hit 20,000 - 
Thank you! Please Suggest To Friends	 Will have some fun stuff for you to play with later 
today. (Appendix One) 
Seven more Reddit posts were found referring to “Shit Harper Did,” and 42 more posts on blogs 
and forums linking to SHD material. The most noteworthy among the bunch, Adbusters and The 
Tyee posted links to SHD content that would have had much higher readership than the 
aforementioned blogs. Four news articles mentioned SHD that first day, which I outlined in the 
next section. The next day, April 15, 2011, the media published six more news articles and SHD 
posted on Facebook, 
We passed 3.5 million hits in the first 36 hours! The national media is embracing our 
message, with some reporting that weve changed the game	...and its all because of YOU. 
We put this thing together, but it is your overwhelming support that gives it true strength. 
New videos on the way... (Appendix One) 
!! !*%!
Figure 3.4: Daily views of “Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line” 
!
As Appendix Two shows, when SHD posted this video on their Facebook page, the link 
got 833 “likes” and 54 comments. This post, in bold in Appendix Two, is also the second-most 
“liked” comment on SHD’s Facebook page before the election. This table also illustrates the 
variation of “likes” SHD content received over the course of the entire campaign.  
The popularity of “Canadian Women’s Favourite Pick-Up Line” and “Ryan Gosling Not 
Endorsing ShitHarperDid” in terms of view counts were also the most popular videos tags found 
in Appendix One. Table 3.4 shows the frequency of each traffic tag found over the course of the 












pictured) that floats onto the page as visitors click through various links on the site, urging them 
to sign-up for more information. The original Harper sketch sits in the headline with a speech 
bubble that scrolls through SHD members’ Tweets, Facebook likes/shares, or public donations. 
This scrolling feed is a NationBuilder feature that helps to highlight active community members 
and encourage others to do the same.  
Image 4.1: Home page of www.shd.ca (June 21, 2014) 
Scrolling further down the main page (Image 4.2), the “Shit Harper Did” style of informing 
visitors about the Prime Minister’s policies is retained. Currently, it features five images that, 
when clicked, reveal windows regarding different issues such as: Members of Parliaments’ 
controversial spending habits, cuts to Canada’s national childcare program, halted environmental 
impact assessments, and the robocalls scandal. For example, this window (Image 4.3), features 
sourced background information, including links to media coverage of the issue, and social 




Image 4.2: Images representing “Shit Harper Did”  
!
Image 4.3: “Stephen Harper is a good economist, in theory” 
 
The site has been under constant construction since its April 2013 launch. SHD builds 
new pages for each new campaign. Permanent pages include: “Why You Matter” compelling 
visitors to join the community; a donation page; a page to “Submit a Fact” about the Harper 
government; a press information page; a volunteer sign-up form; a request form to bring SHD 
organizers to your community; and SHD’s privacy policy, contact information and details about 
contributions and refunds (www.shd.ca). One last page, “Our People” lists SHD’s “Action 
Team.” No longer just a group of friends disgruntled with the Conservative government, there are 
!! !,-!
Image 4.4: New Brunswick SHD supporters photo-bombing CEAP sign 
 
Part III Social Media and SHD’s Anti-CEAP Campaign: Finding New Ways 
to Gain Support 
During this campaign, SHD used social media to facilitate aspects of the campaign, like 
the photo-bombing, but also relied on the various platforms to share the campaign. There was 
much more structure in this approach. The campaign received both support and criticism in 
various networks. I found fewer tags found between April 24, 2013, the date the SHD posted the 
IndieGoGo campaign, and June 1, 2013, marking the last day mainstream media coverage. There 
are, however, proportionally more tags found in mainstream media coverage. Table 4.2 shows 
how many results each tag had, and demonstrates that the majority of the content found was in 









Figure 4.3: SHD content sharing by platform and time 
 
As illustrated in Appendix Four blogs and forums had a slower reaction to this campaign. 
The data in Appendix Four shows that the first blog to even mention the campaign was posted 
two days after the launch of the IndieGoGo campaign. A second blog post was not posted until 
April 28, 2013. One major highlight occurred on April 30, 2013, when The Tyee featured the 
campaign prominently on their site. The Tyee has a large readership and by posting SHD’s 
campaign they further promoted the cause to a group of like-minded Canadians. Over the course 
of the month of May, ten more blog posts encouraged readers to support SHD’s campaign.  
As opposed to the last campaign, where viewers could only watch and share the videos 
made by SHD, this time, SHD encouraged community members to participate by donating 
money or by making content for some of the YouTube videos. On May 7, 2013. SHD started 
!! !-+!
Image 4.6: SHD TV spot with non descript sports fans 
 
Image 4.7: Food bank use in Canada 
 
Other than the rather humorous look and antics of the characters the tone of the television spot is 
quite serious. At the end of the thirty-second advertisement a disclaimer is displayed and read out 





Image 4.8: SHD TV spot disclaimer 
  
Dales recalls, that a volunteer crew made the advertisement in 48 hours. He explains that 
there was an unknown learning curve that comes with producing content for televisions. For 
example, to his memory, the ad aired between a Ford and a Wendy’s commercial which really 
highlighted the low quality of their own video. Dales (2014) explains, 
For example, our audio on the master was turned way down so people couldnt hear what 
the hell was going on during the commercial. So that stuff was difficult when you put it on 
next to something that had a million a half budget for a thirty second spot. 
The SHD organizers were still amateurs in the field even with the new tool kit of strategies they 
had picked up during the two years preceding this campaign.  
Part IV Media Analysis: “Anti-Harper comedians seek ‘meaningful’ change”18 
As with the 2011 campaign, breaking into a ‘political information cycle’ for this 
campaign was equally advantageous. During the 2011 federal election, SHD broke into this cycle 
because of the instant popularity of their videos and site. In this campaign, SHD not only put 
their campaign on television, directly against the government ads, they also gained news 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 (Kane, 2013)  
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NEW report reveals the government misplaced $3.1 billion in “anti-terrorism” funding. The other $9.8 
billion they didn’t lose was used for things like infringing on our basic civil liberties, targeting people of 
colour as well as indigenous and environmental activists as “terrorists.” READ MORE: 







GOOD NEWS! First New Mexico, now Nova Scotia! We should all change the names of our homes to 
“N-something Something.”  




152 Likes  
8 Comments 
49 Shares 
This Saturday SHD community members across the country will be photo-bombing 
Conservative Economic Action Plan ads! If you want your photo-bomb to be featured in next 
week’s SHD video please RSVP to this Thursday’s special conference call by clicking here: 




37 Likes  
3 Comments 
2 Shares  
Live in Nova Scotia, PEI, MB, SK or Nunavut? We are looking for one person from your province to 
make our next project happen! Can you take a special photo this Saturday and be part of 







BREAKING NEWS: Today a Toronto Star investigation found that 90% of $2.4 billion paid for 
“management consulting” comes with no description of the work done. LIKE/SHARE if you think people 
deserve to know how their money is being spent. JOIN US: http://www.shd.ca/why_you_matter 







Live in Newfoundland? We are looking for one person from your province to make our next project 
happen! Can you take a special photo this Saturday and be part of ShitHarperDid’’s next video? 
Comment to let us know if you’re interested. 
09-
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7 Likes 
7 Comments 
1 Share 
